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What a Difference a Day Makes, or Does It?        
Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week 
MICHELLE A. TRAVIS 
 
This Article considers the growing reliance that four-day work week 
advocates have placed on work/family claims.  It begins by analyzing 
whether a compressed work schedule may alleviate work/family conflicts, 
and more importantly, for whom such benefits are most likely to accrue.  
While studies consistently find that many workers experience lower levels 
of work/family conflict when working a compressed schedule, the research 
also suggests that workers with the most acute work/family conflicts may 
be the least likely either to obtain or to benefit from a four-day work week 
design.  Nevertheless, the political climate surrounding the four-day work 
week provides a unique opportunity for action.  This Article therefore 
considers how legal regulation might be used to shape four-day work week 
initiatives as a work/family balance tool.  In particular, the Article 
considers how reflexive law proposals might contribute to the four-day 
work week debate.  While existing reflexive law models typically rely on 
the creation and exercise of procedural rights vested in individual workers, 
this Article explores an under-developed alternative that would instead 
vest procedural rights primarily in workers as a group.  The Article uses 
California’s extensive four-day work week regulations and the Federal 
Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act to illustrate this 
“collective reflexive” approach, and to explore what this type of 
regulatory model might offer advocates who are seeking to facilitate 
greater work/family balance for those who may need it the most. 
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What a Difference a Day Makes, or Does It? 
Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week 
MICHELLE A. TRAVIS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the themes that proponents of the four-day work week have 
been increasingly relying upon is the potential benefit that a compressed 
work schedule may provide for workers who are balancing paid work with 
family care.  This work/family theme, however, frequently shows up as an 
afterthought rather than as a driving force in shaping the development of 
four-day work week policies.  For example, the Federal Employees 
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act,1 which encourages federal 
agencies to offer their employees compressed work schedules, was initially 
pitched in the 1970s as a traffic congestion measure.2  Two decades later, 
the Clinton administration began touting the Act as a model program for 
building a family-friendly workplace, even though no meaningful 
work/family research had informed the Act’s enactment or design.3  This 
Article considers the growing reliance that four-day work week advocates 
have placed on work/family claims.  Specifically, it analyzes both the 
extent to which a compressed work schedule may alleviate work/family 
conflicts, and more importantly, for whom such benefits are most likely to 
accrue.  The goal of this analysis is to help better inform and position 
work/family advocates to more effectively steer the four-day work week 
debate. 
Part II begins by reviewing the existing social science literature on the 
work/family impact of compressed work schedules.  Most of this research 
has focused on the threshold inquiry of whether or not a four-day work 
week can alleviate work/family conflict for those workers who gain access 
to a compressed work schedule.  As Part II.A explains, this research 
                                                                                                                          
*  Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law.  I would like to thank Rachel Arnow-
Richman and Vicki Schultz for important insights that shaped my thinking on this project, Jessica 
Simmons for her research assistance, and Richard Dickson for his support. 
1 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120–6133 (2006).  This law also is referred to as the Alternative Work Schedules 
Act (“AWSA”).  Janet M. Liechty & Elaine A. Anderson, Flexible Workplace Policies: Lessons from 
the Federal Alternative Work Schedules Act, 56 FAM. REL. 304, 305 (2007).  For a description of the 
legislative history of the AWSA, see infra notes 38–45 and accompanying text. 
2 See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307. 
3 See id. at 307–10 (explaining how the AWSA, which “was first meant to deal with Washington, 
DC traffic congestion in 1978,” ultimately became “a centerpiece of federal family-friendly policies by 
1997,” without any meaningful consideration of work/family research). 
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appears quite positive on its face by consistently finding that many 
workers’ self-reported levels of work/family conflict are lower when 
working a compressed schedule than for workers laboring under a more 
traditional five-day work week.4  While certainly promising, these research 
results provide an insufficient basis, on their own, either for asserting 
generally that the four-day work week enhances work/family balance, or 
for prioritizing four-day work week initiatives over other work/family 
policies.  Such conclusions demand an additional level of research that 
moves beyond just identifying a link between the four-day work week and 
reduced work/family conflict, to also considering which workers will likely 
experience such positive results.  
Undifferentiated claims about the work/family benefits of a four-day 
work week often are premised on an assumption of a homogeneous 
workforce facing homogeneous work/family conflicts.  Part II.B challenges 
that assumption, not only by considering the types of workers who are least 
likely to experience work/family benefits from a four-day schedule, but 
also by identifying the large population of workers who are unlikely to 
gain access to a four-day work week altogether.  The research suggests that 
workers with the most acute work/family conflicts often will be among 
those least likely either to obtain or to benefit from a four-day work week.  
This is in part the result of the growing bifurcation of the workforce into 
very long-hour, full-time positions and very short-hour, part-time jobs.5  
Since 1970, the forty-hour work week—which often is associated with 
relatively low initial levels of work/family conflict and which is most 
easily transitioned into a four-day schedule—has become increasingly less 
typical.6  In contrast, the growing workforce laboring in jobs at both ends 
of the emerging “time divide”—i.e., jobs that are least likely to be 
redesigned into a four-day work week—often experience the highest levels 
of work/family conflict, from very different sources, which will require 
very different solutions to address.7  Part II.B also questions the ability of 
the four-day work week to meaningfully alter the existing gendered 
division of labor that contributes to the severe work/family conflicts 
experienced by many women who are combining paid work with 
disproportionate family care. 
Although the conclusions in Part II thus raise doubts about whether a 
four-day work week should find its way to the top of a work/family 
advocate’s policy agenda, Part III recognizes that the current business, 
media, and political attention being paid to the four-day work week 
                                                                                                                          
4 See infra notes 12–36 and accompanying text. 
5 See JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER 
INEQUALITY 5, 36, 60 (2004); see also infra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
6 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 32–33, 33 fig.1.4; see also infra notes 66–68 and 
accompanying text. 
7 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 5; see also infra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. 
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provides a unique opportunity for action.  Part III therefore considers how 
legal regulation of the four-day work week might shape this particular 
form of workplace flexibility most effectively as a work/family initiative. 
To that end, Part III begins by considering the three major approaches 
that have dominated work/family discourse about workplace flexibility 
more generally.  On one end of the spectrum are top-down “command-and-
control” approaches that rely on prescriptive rules and sanctions for non-
compliance.8  On the other end of the spectrum are forms of market-based 
governance, which focus not on legal intervention but on making the 
business case for flexibility to maximize voluntary and efficient 
experimentation with working time innovation.9  In the middle of these two 
extremes lies the burgeoning “new governance” literature, which 
emphasizes public oversight of private, regulatory initiatives, including 
various forms of “reflexive law,” which focus on procedural rather than 
substantive obligations to facilitate information exchange and self-
regulation.10  The new governance scholars have made a compelling case 
that this middle-ground approach may provide a viable solution both to 
regulatory and market failures by recognizing that “economic efficiency 
and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.”11 
While the reflexive law proposals within the new governance approach 
have much to offer work/family advocates who are considering effective 
regulation of the four-day work week, these proposals typically rely on the 
creation and exercise of individual worker rights.  Part III uses California’s 
extensive four-day work week regulations and the Federal Employees 
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act as two examples of a 
different reflexive approach—one that vests procedural rights primarily in 
workers as a group, rather than as individuals.  Part III explores this 
“collective reflexive” approach as one additional regulatory method for 
work/family advocates to consider when entering the four-day work week 
debate.  While Part III ultimately concludes that California’s approach, in 
particular, may be too complicated to be truly effective, these examples 
nevertheless illustrate an important and under-developed regulatory model 
for expanding workplace flexibility to facilitate greater work/family 
balance for those who may need it the most. 
                                                                                                                          
8 See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 111–22 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
11 See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004); see also infra note 125 and 
accompanying text. 
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II.  THE FOUR-DAY WORK WEEK AND WORK/FAMILY BALANCE:   
MOVING FROM “WHETHER OR NOT?” TO “FOR WHOM?” 
This section reviews the existing social science research on the 
work/family impact of compressed work schedules.  It begins by asking 
whether or not any link has been established between a four-day work 
week and reduced work/family conflict.  While the research answers this 
question in the affirmative, this section goes on to explore, more 
specifically, for whom such benefits are most likely to accrue.  Because the 
research suggests that workers with the most acute work/family conflicts 
often may be among those least likely either to obtain or to benefit from a 
four-day work week, this section raises doubts as to whether work/family 
advocates should—if writing on a clean slate—prioritize four-day work 
week initiatives over other work/family policy measures. 
A.  Whether or Not? 
Although four-day work week advocates rarely cite research to support 
their sweeping assertions of work/family benefits, the totality of the 
research indeed has established that such a link exists in certain 
circumstances.  These studies typically rely on worker surveys that provide 
self-reports of work/family conflict levels.  They attempt to establish a 
causal connection between compressed work schedules and reduced 
work/family conflict by comparing the responses of workers on a 
compressed schedule to workers on a more traditional schedule, or by 
asking workers to make a before-and-after comparison of their own 
experience after moving from a traditional to a compressed work week.  As 
a whole, this body of research provides a fairly optimistic assessment of 
the potential for the four-day work week to serve as a work/family balance 
tool. 
One of the best examples of this type of research is a study conducted 
by leading sociologists Rex L. Facer II and Lori Wadsworth.12  In this 
study, Facer and Wadsworth analyzed whether a compressed work week 
affected self-reported levels of work/family conflict in a group of city 
government workers in a small but growing western community.13  In 
2003, the city had shifted workers in some of its departments to a four-day, 
ten-hour per day work week (also known as a “4/10”), which generally was 
                                                                                                                          
12 See generally Rex L. Facer II & Lori Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules and Work 
Family Balance: A Research Note, 28 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 166 (2008), available at 
http://rop.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/28/2/166 [hereinafter Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative 
Work Schedules].  For updated commentary on this study, presented at this Symposium, see generally 
Rex L. Facer II & Lori L. Wadsworth, Four-Day Work Weeks: Current Research and Practice, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1031 (2010). 
13 Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules, supra note 12, at 166–68. 
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scheduled from 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday.14  To 
obtain comparative results, Facer and Wadsworth surveyed both workers 
who had switched to the compressed work week and workers who had 
remained on a more traditional schedule of five working days per week.15 
The surveys included six variables that assessed both work-to-family 
conflict (i.e., the extent to which work impacts family life) and family-to-
work conflict (i.e., the extent to which family life impacts work).16  The 
researchers asked respondents to assess each variable on a scale of one 
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree).17  The work-to-family conflict 
variables asked workers whether they came home from work too tired, 
whether their work took away from their personal interests, and whether 
their work took up time that they would rather spend with family or 
friends.18  The family-to-work variables asked workers whether they found 
themselves too tired at work because of activities at home, whether their 
personal demands took away from their work, and whether their personal 
lives took up time that they would rather spend at work.19  The researchers 
also asked those working the four-day schedule to assess the extent to 
which the compressed work week had made their childcare arrangements 
more difficult.20 
Overall, the results support the view that a four-day work week 
facilitates work/family balance.  Workers on the four-day work week 
reported lower levels of work/family conflict than workers on more 
traditional schedules on five of the six variables examined, with four of 
those differences registering at a statistically significant level.21  When the 
individual variables were combined into two overall scales—one for work-
to-family conflict and one for family-to-work conflict—the workers on the 
four-day schedule reported lower levels of conflict at statistically 
significant levels on both scales.22 
In a multivariate analysis, Facer and Wadsworth demonstrated that the 
lower levels of work-to-family conflict experienced by those on the four-
day schedule existed even when holding other variables constant, including 
job satisfaction levels, the number of dependants living in the worker’s 
home, the worker’s age, and the worker’s length of employment with the 
                                                                                                                          
14 Id. at 168. 
15 Id. at 168–69.  The researchers received 132 usable surveys, and sixty percent of those 
respondents were working the four-day, ten-hour-per-day schedule.  Id. at 169–70. 
16 Id. at 172, 172 tbl.4. 
17 Id. at 172 tbl.4. 
18 Id. at 172–73, 172 tbl.4. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 170–71, 171 tbl.2. 
21 Id. at 172–73, 172 tbl.4.  The two groups provided similar responses on the remaining variable: 
feeling too tired at work because of home activities.  Id. at 172 tbl.4, 173. 
22 Id. 
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city.23  The worker’s age, number of dependants at home, and length of 
employment with the city also had no influence on the level of family-to-
work conflict, which was influenced most heavily by a worker’s rating on 
the work-to-family conflict scale.24  Additionally, only 2.7% of the 
respondents who had moved to the four-day work week agreed or strongly 
agreed that childcare arrangements had become more difficult under the 
compressed work schedule.25  Based on these results, Facer and 
Wadsworth concluded that “employees working the 4/10 work-week 
experience lower levels of work-family conflict than their counterparts 
who are working other schedules in the city.”26 
This study followed an earlier project that reported similar results in 
the late 1990s.27  In that prior project, sociologist Michael J. Gilbert and 
political scientist Arturo Vega studied how the move from a five-day per 
week schedule to a three-day compressed work week affected self-reports 
of work/family conflict among patrol officers at a Texas county sheriff’s 
department.28  The researchers surveyed officers who had been assigned to 
patrol for at least one year both before and after the compressed work week 
was implemented and asked them to compare their experiences on the 
traditional and the compressed work schedules.29  Over eighty-five percent 
of these patrol officers reported that the compressed work week schedule 
made it “‘easier’ or ‘much easier’ to devote time to family members,” and 
over seventy-six percent reported finding it “easier to conduct family and 
personal activities.”30 
One of the earliest formal studies on the four-day work week found 
strikingly similar results in 1970 using interviews and written surveys of 
148 workers who had a four-day schedule at thirteen different firms 
engaged in the manufacturing, service, and retail industries.31  In that 
                                                                                                                          
23 Id. at 173–74, 174 tbl.6. 
24 Id. at 174–75, 175 tbl.7. 
25 Id. at 170–71. 
26 Id. at 175.  See also Lori L. Wadsworth & Rex L. Facer II, Does the Four Day Work Week 
Work?, FOX NEWS, July 7, 2009, http://foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,530392,00.html 
(reporting on a follow-up study that surveyed 150 human resource directors, fifty-four percent of whom 
reported improved work/family balance as an organizational benefit of alternative work schedules). 
27 See generally Arturo Vega & Michael J. Gilbert, Longer Days, Shorter Weeks: Compressed 
Work Weeks in Policing, 26 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 391 (1997). 
28 See id. at 391.  In 1993, these workers moved from a traditional five-day work week to a three-
day work week with each work day consisting of thirteen hours and twenty minutes of work.  Id. at 
391, 393.  The research results were based on surveys of 103 officers who had been assigned to patrol 
for both one year before and one year after the move from a traditional five-day, forty-hour work week 
to the compressed three-day, forty-hour work week.  Id. at 393. 
29 Id. at 393. 
30 Id. at 395. 
31 James L. Steele & Riva Poor, Work and Leisure: The Reactions of People at 4-Day Firms, in 4 
DAYS, 40 HOURS: REPORTING A REVOLUTION IN WORK AND LEISURE 105, 105–07, 111, 115 (Riva 
Poor ed., 1970).  The study also included twenty managers.  Id. at 106.  Of the 148 workers included in 
the study, eighty-four were males and sixty-four were females.  Id.  Most of the workers were factory 
personnel, with a smaller number of office, sales, and professional personnel as well.  Id. at 106–07.  
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study, seventy-five percent of the workers reported spending more time 
with their families when working a four-day work week rather than a five-
day schedule.32  In response to an open-ended question asking the workers 
to list advantages of the four-day work week, twenty-five cited the benefit 
of increased family time.33 
These findings are consistent with other studies on the work/family 
effects of a compressed work week both within and outside the United 
States.34  These include, among others, a recent meta-analysis of forty 
studies from around the world that analyzed the effects of a compressed 
work week on workers performing shift work, which the researchers 
defined as any schedule that regularly includes work time outside of 
standard business hours.35 The majority of these studies found 
improvements in workers’ reported levels of work/family balance after the 
compressed work week was introduced.36  As a whole, this body of 
research is quite promising.  By demonstrating that a causal link can exist 
between compressed work schedules and improved work/family balance, 
this research takes the important first step of validating consideration of 
four-day work week initiatives within a work/family agenda. 
 
                                                                                                                          
The firms were primarily in the greater Boston area, although some were located in California, Florida, 
and Oklahoma.  Id. at 107.  For reflections on the historical context of the four-day work week 
presented at this Symposium, see generally Riva Poor, How and Why Flexible Work Weeks Came 
About, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1047 (2010). 
32 Steele & Poor, supra note 31, at 115. 
33 Id. at 111 & tbl.3. 
34 See, e.g., C. Bambra et al., “A Hard Day’s Night?”  The Effects of Compressed Working Week 
Interventions on the Health and Work-Life Balance of Shift Workers: A Systematic Review, 62 J. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY COMM. HEALTH 764, 766, 768–73 (2008) (conducting a meta-analysis of forty studies 
from around the world and concluding that the majority of studies found that a compressed work week 
improved work/family balance for shift workers); E. Jeffrey Hill et al., Finding an Extra Day a Week: 
The Positive Influence of Perceived Job Flexibility on Work and Family Life Balance, 50 FAM. REL. 
49, 53–54 (2001) (summarizing the results of a large-scale survey of employees at IBM Corporation in 
1996 that found that the availability of various flextime policies, including the compressed work week, 
reduced the percentage of workers who reported work/family conflicts); Liechty & Anderson, supra 
note 1, at 306 (noting that various government reports have documented work/family benefits for 
federal employees who gained access to alternative work schedules, including compressed work weeks, 
under the AWSA); Atefeh Sadri McCampbell, Benefits Achieved Through Alternative Work Schedules, 
19 HUM. RES. PLAN. 30, 31–32 (1996) (studying federal agency workers and finding that 
approximately fifty-four percent of those who were providing dependant care were using some type of 
flexible work arrangement, including compressed work week schedules, and that doing so was “very 
important to their decision to remain with their agency”); Simcha Ronen & Sophia B. Primps, The 
Compressed Work Week as Organizational Change: Behavioral and Attitudinal Outcomes, 6 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 61, 64–67, 69 (1981) (summarizing studies done in the 1970s and finding that four of the 
six studies measuring work/family balance reported that a compressed work week had “a positive effect 
on home and personal life”). 
35 Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 764–65. 
36 Id. at 768. 
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B.  For Whom? 
Feminist legal theorists have long challenged the assumption that all 
forms of workplace flexibility are beneficial for all caregivers.37  As four-
day work week advocates place increasing reliance on claims of 
work/family benefits, there has become an increasing need to apply that 
insight to this particular context.  Specifically, research inquiries must 
move beyond just proving that a causal link can exist between compressed 
work schedules and reduced work/family conflict, to also identifying the 
types of workers for whom such benefits are most and least likely to 
accrue.  This section provides a preliminary assessment of this secondary 
inquiry by considering which workers are unlikely to experience improved 
work/family balance while working a compressed schedule, which workers 
are unlikely to obtain access to a four-day work week, and the likelihood 
that a four-day work week will make inroads into the gendered division of 
labor that contributes to work/family conflicts for many women. This 
analysis provides a much less uniformly positive picture of the four-day 
work week as a work/family balance tool. 
One of the earliest analyses of these critical “for whom” questions was 
performed during the federal legislative debates over whether to enact the 
Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act—also 
known as the Alternative Work Schedules Act (“AWSA”)38—on a 
permanent basis in the early 1980s.39  The AWSA permits and creates 
incentives for federal agencies to offer both compressed work schedules 
and flextime, which allows employees to alter their daily start and stop 
times within certain defined parameters.40  The federal government initially 
enacted the AWSA in 1978 on a three-year experimental basis as a traffic 
congestion measure and energy savings initiative in response to the energy 
crisis of the late 1970s.41  Although one senator mentioned the potential 
benefits that flextime might provide for workers seeking to balance work 
with family obligations, personal business, or civic commitments, the 
initial congressional hearings on the AWSA were neither driven nor 
                                                                                                                          
37 See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 310. 
38 Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120–6133 
(2006); see Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305 (describing the alternative and commonly-used 
title for the Act, AWSA). 
39 See HALCYONE H. BOHEN & ANAMARIA VIVEROS-LONG, BALANCING JOBS AND FAMILY LIFE 
84, 107–09, 126–29 (1981); see also Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306–07 (describing the 
Bohen and Viveros-Long research findings). 
40 See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306.  The AWSA incentivizes the use of compressed 
work weeks by exempting federal agencies from existing daily overtime premiums if the agency 
follows certain procedures to adopt the compressed work schedule.  See infra notes 218–27 and 
accompanying text. 
41 Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307. 
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informed by a work/family balance perspective.42  Congress re-authorized 
the AWSA on another three-year experimental basis in 1982 after 
additional hearings in which a work/family analysis was once again 
conspicuously absent.43  Congress finally enacted the AWSA on a 
permanent basis in 1985, and it was not until that third round of hearings 
that work/family arguments were finally deployed—and then, largely as a 
convenient afterthought.44 
It was at the third hearing stage that supporters of the AWSA began 
making general claims about the AWSA’s ability to solve work/family 
conflicts, relying on a number of government studies of the AWSA during 
its experimental periods that had provided positive—but undifferentiated—
evidence of the AWSA’s work/family benefits.45  It was in this context that 
researchers Halcyone Bohen and Anamaria Viveros-Long performed the 
first rigorous analysis of the work/family effects of the AWSA’s 
experimental use.46  Bohen and Viveros-Long particularly were interested 
in testing two core assumptions upon which the legislative testimony in 
favor of the AWSA’s permanent status implicitly relied: the assumptions 
that flextime uniformly facilitates work/family balance and that flextime 
helps equalize the gendered division of domestic work.47  This research 
project focused exclusively on federal agencies’ use of flextime under the 
AWSA, rather than the use of a compressed work week,48 but its 
discouraging conclusions in the former context provide a credible basis for 
raising concerns about broad-reaching claims of work/family benefits from 
a four-day work week as well. 
In the Bohen and Viveros-Long study, the researchers surveyed 313 
employees at a federal agency using a standard five-day work week and 
393 employees at a federal agency that permitted flextime.49  Employees at 
the flextime agency could exercise some control over their start and stop 
times, but their work was still spread out over five days each week.50  At a 
general level, the study’s results were consistent with the assertion that 
flextime reduces work/family conflicts: the mean level of self-reported 
work/family stress for the overall group of flextime employees was 
significantly lower than the mean level of self-reported work/family stress 
                                                                                                                          
42 See id. at 307 (describing the remarks of Senator Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York, at 
the Senate hearings). 
43 See id. at 308–09 (observing that “the benefits of the AWSA for working mothers and 
families . . . was curiously sidelined in the 1982 Senate hearings,” and that “[t]he dilemmas faced by 
increasing numbers of mothers in the workforce were largely ignored in this round of hearings”). 
44 See id. at 309. 
45 See id. at 306, 309. 
46 See id. at 306–07 (describing the Bohen and Viveros-Long research in the context of the 
legislative history of the AWSA). 
47 BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 126. 
48 See id. at 84. 
49 Id. at 108–09. 
50 Id. at 84. 
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for the overall group of employees on a standard five-day schedule.51  In 
addition, both parents as a whole and women as a whole reported 
significantly less work/family stress at the flextime agency than at the 
agency with a traditional schedule.52 
When the researchers differentiated the results further, however, the 
picture became far less rosy.  When focusing solely on mothers, whether 
married or single, the study found that the ability of flextime to reduce 
work/family stress “disappear[ed] altogether.”53  Flextime provided no 
reduction in work/family stress for women who were trying to balance 
participation in the paid labor market with primary childcare 
responsibility.54  Fathers who had spouses employed outside the home 
similarly reported no less work/family stress when working flextime versus 
working a standard schedule.55  The only parents for whom flextime 
reduced work/family conflict were fathers whose wives were not employed 
outside the home.56  The primary groups of employees who reported 
having less work/family stress on a flextime schedule than on a standard 
schedule—and whose responses explained the overall finding of flextime’s 
positive work/family effects—were employees who did not have primary 
childcare responsibility, including single adults without children, married 
women without children, and fathers whose wives were not engaged in 
paid labor.57  What the undifferentiated positive survey results thus failed 
to reveal was the fact that it was employees who began with the lowest 
levels of work/family conflict who were ultimately helped the most.58  
“[T]he simpler the family circumstances,” concluded the researchers, “the 
more relative impact a little schedule flexibility seems to have.”59 
This revealing study was largely ignored during the legislative debates 
around the permanent enactment of the AWSA, which nevertheless relied 
upon asserted work/family benefits as an additional reason for supporting 
the AWSA on a long-term basis.  Although the study focused on flextime 
rather than a four-day work week, its findings highlight the importance of 
looking beyond generalized survey results that find work/family benefits 
for groups of workers as a whole. 
In the two most prominent studies of compressed work weeks 
described above, the published data does not differentiate among workers 
                                                                                                                          
51 Id. at 127. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 127–29. 
54 See id. at 129. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 128–29. 
57 Id. at 129.  See also Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306–07 (describing the Bohen and 
Viveros-Long findings). 
58 See BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 148, 192; see also Liechty & Anderson, supra 
note 1, at 306–07. 
59 BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 148. 
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within the survey pools to the degree necessary to permit as detailed an 
analysis as in Bohen and Viveros-Long’s study.  Nevertheless, considering 
even the shared characteristics of the workers within the survey pools 
reveals a potentially significant limit to the work/family benefits that were 
documented in both projects.  Most importantly, the workers in both 
studies shared one crucial similarity: they all worked at or very near a 
regular, forty-hour work week before the transition to a compressed 
schedule occurred. 
In the Facer and Wadsworth study, which found positive work/family 
effects from introducing a four-day, forty-hour work week among city 
government workers, 85.9% of the respondents who were working the 
four-day schedule reported no change in their overall hours since they 
transitioned from the five-day work week.60  An additional 9.6% of the 
respondents had experienced a decrease in their overall working hours 
since moving to the four-day work week61 (likely due to a decrease in 
periodic overtime once the regular work day became ten hours per day).  In 
the Vega and Gilbert study of patrol officers, which also found overall 
positive work/family effects from the adoption of a compressed work 
week, ninety-seven percent of the respondents were male, and all of them 
had been working a five-day, forty-hour schedule before transitioning to a 
three-day, forty-hour week.62 
This observation is important in assessing the significance and 
generalizability of these studies’ findings for two related reasons.  First, 
workers who have a regular forty-hour work week are typically among 
those who experience relatively low levels of work/family conflict as an 
initial starting point.63  Thus, Bohen and Viveros-Long’s conclusion that 
workers with the least severe work/family conflicts are likely to be helped 
the most by flextime arrangements may apply to the four-day work week 
context as well.  Second, the percentage of the workforce that regularly 
works forty-hour-per-week jobs—which are most easily transitioned to a 
four-day work week—has been decreasing over the last three decades.64  
Thus, many workers with the most severe work/family conflicts are likely 
to be among those least likely to gain access to a four-day work week 
altogether.  This is not an indictment of the very important results that both 
the Facer and Wadsworth study and the Vega and Gilbert study produced 
                                                                                                                          
60 Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules, supra note 12, at 170 (noting that only 14.1% 
of the respondents who worked the four-day schedule reported a change in overall working hours). 
61 Id. 
62 Vega & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 393–95. 
63 See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text. 
64 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 32–33, 33 fig.1.4 (reporting a ten percent decline between 
1970 and 2000 in the percentage of the workforce working a forty-hour work week, and explaining 
that, although the average work week remained stable, “[v]ariation around the average has increased, 
marking the emergence of both longer and shorter workweeks for different groups of workers”). 
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by demonstrating in a rigorous and compelling manner that a compressed 
work week can reduce work/family conflicts for many workers who are 
able to access such schedules.  These observations merely suggest the 
potentially narrow group of workers for whom such results are likely to 
apply.65 
These limitations are predicted by the work of sociologists Jerry A. 
Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, who have documented a “growing time 
divide” within the American labor force.66  Since 1970, the forty-hour 
work week has become increasingly less typical for both women and 
men,67 as occupations have become increasingly divided between “jobs 
that demand excessively long days and jobs that provide neither sufficient 
time nor money to meet workers’ needs.”68  This bifurcation of working 
hours has both gender and class effects.69  Low-hour, part-time jobs are 
held predominantly by women, while long-hour, full-time jobs are held 
predominantly by men.70  The relatively small group of women who are 
laboring at the long end of the time divide, typically as managers or 
professionals, often experience high levels of work/family conflict as a 
result of workplace norms that demand extremely long hours.71  The larger 
group of women who are laboring at the short end of the time divide also 
frequently experience high levels of work/family conflict, often as the 
result of unpredictable schedules, number of hours, and income.72  This 
                                                                                                                          
65 See Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules, supra note 12, at 176 (acknowledging 
that their study is “of a limited group,” and encouraging additional research). 
66 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 5, 36, 60, 63 (analyzing the results of a national survey 
in the 1990s of over 3000 workers); see also Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a 
Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY: 
THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 132 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owen eds., 2006) (describing 
the growing bifurcation of working hours). 
67 JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 32–33, 33 fig.1.4. 
68 Id. at 8. 
69 See Michelle A. Travis, The Future of Work-Family Policy: Is “Choice” the Right Choice?, 13 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 385, 403–14 (2009) [hereinafter Travis, Work-Family Policy]; see also 
JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS 
COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 29 (2006), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/ 
OptOutPushedOut.pdf. 
70 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 33 fig.1.4, 34 tbl.1.2, 35.  In 2000, over twenty-six 
percent of men in the U.S. were working fifty or more hours per week, while less than nine percent 
were working less than thirty hours per week.  Id.  During the same year, less than twelve percent of 
women were working fifty or more hours per week, while nearly twenty percent were working thirty 
hours or less.  Id. 
71 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 29–31; Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at 
405–06. 
72 See Ronald E. Bulanda & Stephen Lippmann, Wrinkles in Parental Time with Children: Work, 
Family Structure, and Gender, 13 MICH. FAM. REV. 5, 10–12 (2009) (explaining how the “resurgence 
of irregular and unpredictable nonstandard work shifts,” which are typically involuntary for low-
income workers, contributes to severe work/family conflicts for workers in low-income jobs); Posting 
of Liz Watson & Jessica Glenn to Work and Family Blog, http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/blog/           
flexible-work-arrangements-improving-job-quality-and-workforce-stability-for-low-wage-workers-and 
-their-employers (Sept. 7, 2009) (explaining that low-income workers often face acute work/family 
conflicts because they are “more likely to face involuntary part-time work, rigid or unpredictable 
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group of low-income women frequently faces even more rigid workplace 
environments than high-income women, often risking severe job 
consequences or job loss for even minor schedule breaches due to 
caregiving obligations.73 
Evidence suggests that this growing bifurcation of jobs into long-hour 
and short-hour positions is not a straightforward reflection of workers’ 
preferences,74 as a growing majority of workers report a mismatch between 
their actual and ideal working hours.75  The growing group of workers at 
the high end of the time divide typically would prefer to work less, while 
the growing group of workers at the low end of the time divide frequently 
would prefer to work more.76  Workers who are unhappy with their number 
                                                                                                                          
schedules, or night, evening and weekend work,” as well as “unstable income and job loss”).  See also 
generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED: 
WHEN “OPTING OUT” IS NOT AN OPTION (2006) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ONE SICK CHILD], available 
at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/onesickchild.pdf (describing the unique aspects of low-income 
jobs that contribute to severe work/family conflicts). 
73 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 35–36; WILLIAMS, ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 72, at 
3, 8–14; see also JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 104 (finding from survey results that white-collar 
workers have more job flexibility and control over their work schedules than blue-collar workers); 
Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 313 (noting that “professionals are more likely to have access to 
voluntary flexible work schedules than lower wage employees,” that “many low-income families 
endure highly complex, time-pressed lives in order to survive,” and that “the families who are most 
economically stressed are often the ones whose jobs offer the least flexibility or security in the face of 
family needs”); Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women in the Workplace: Which Women, Which 
Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 13–17 (2006) (explaining the reasons why, “[d]espite 
their longer hours, professional workers often have the most flexibility and control over their work 
time”).  In general, “most flexible work options are contingent upon worker technological savvy and 
professional autonomy . . . which exclude most low-wage workers.”  Liechty & Anderson, supra note 
1, at 313.  Not only do women working short-hour, part-time positions face workplace rigidity, but they 
also face long-lasting decreases in occupational mobility, compensation, benefits, and promotion 
opportunities.  See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 96–100 (2000); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 30–31; Travis, Work-
Family Policy, supra note 69, at 412.  For additional, related commentary presented at this Symposium, 
see generally Shirley Lung, The Four Day Work Week: But What About Ms. Coke, Ms. Upton, and Ms. 
Blankenship?, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1119 (2010). 
74 See Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at 412–14; see also JACOBS & GERSON, supra 
note 5, at 5 (concluding from a national survey of over 3000 workers in the 1990s that “workers’ actual 
time at work does not necessarily reflect their desires”). 
75 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 64 tbl.3.1, 65–67, 77 (reporting data from 1997 and 
concluding that “most American workers experience a significant gap between how much they work 
and how much they would like to work,” and that this group is growing over time); WILLIAMS ET AL., 
supra note 69, at 30 (describing a national survey of 500 dual-career families in which sixty-five 
percent of women in full-time jobs reported wanting to work part-time).  In a 1997 survey, only one-
fifth of workers surveyed reported that their actual working hours matched their ideal working hours, 
while three-fifths reported that their actual hours were longer than their ideal, and one-fifth reported 
that their actual hours were shorter than their ideal.  JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 64 tbl.3.1.  
These figures do not include the unemployed, who should be added to those who desire greater 
working hours.  Id. at 64. 
76 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 5, 36, 60, 63 (drawing this conclusion from the results 
of a national survey of over 3000 workers during the 1990s); see also Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 
66, at 132–33, 149 (advocating for an expanded supply of short-hour, full-time jobs).  Because men are 
over-represented in long-hour jobs and women are over-represented in short-hour, part-time positions, 
“[t]he result is many fathers working longer hours than they would like and many mothers working 
fewer hours than they would like.”  WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 3. 
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of working hours most frequently cite as “ideal” a job that would allow 
combining caregiving responsibilities with approximately thirty to forty 
hours of paid work per week.77  While this aspiration unites workers across 
both gender and class lines,78 it is becoming increasingly difficult to realize 
as fewer workers are able to regularly work close to forty hours per week.79 
This research suggests that the four-day work week will at best be a 
partial solution to the multi-faceted sources of work/family conflict.  
Despite its recent explosion, the use of a four-day work week is unlikely to 
become available either for workers whose jobs currently demand hours in 
excess of forty or fifty per week, or for workers whose jobs often provide 
variable hours that routinely fall below twenty per week.  While a four-day 
work week may provide very real work/family benefits for the decreasing 
portion of the workforce that is currently laboring at or near a forty-hour 
work week, those workers tend to be among the group whose work/family 
conflicts are both the least acute and the most easily resolved.  This 
explains why some work/family scholars have focused their sights on legal 
and policy initiatives for expanding the supply of high-quality, thirty-five 
to forty-hour jobs, rather than on increasing working time flexibility.80 
Even for workers who are able to gain access to a four-day work week, 
a closer look at the research raises doubts about the ability of the four-day 
work week to do more than just alleviate work/family pressures by 
compressing work hours and thereby freeing up larger blocks of time.  
That benefit is certainly important and produces measurable reductions in 
work/family conflict, as documented in the studies described above.  A 
deeper analysis of the research, however, suggests that the four-day work 
week is unlikely to make meaningful inroads into the gendered division of 
labor that contributes so significantly to many women’s conflicting work 
and family demands.  Even though both men and women were among the 
                                                                                                                          
77 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 64–69; WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 30; Travis, 
Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at 412–13.  In a very large 1997 survey, employees were 
categorized by their current number of working hours per week: employees working less than thirty 
hours; employees working thirty to thirty-nine hours; employees working forty to forty-nine hours; 
employees working fifty to fifty-nine hours; and employees working sixty or more hours.  JACOBS & 
GERSON, supra note 5, at 66 fig.3.1.  The average number of hours reported as “ideal” within each of 
these categories was strikingly similar, regardless of gender.  Id.  Male workers’ “ideal” ranged from 
approximately thirty-two to forty-two hours per week, while female workers’ “ideal” ranged from 
approximately twenty-seven to forty-one hours per week.  Id. 
78 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 78; Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at 
412–13. 
79 See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 77; see also WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 30 
(emphasizing the “inability to find good jobs requiring 30 to 40 hours per week,” and noting that “[t]he 
United States has relatively few good, 35 to 40 hour per week jobs”).  One study has found that among 
employed workers between the ages of twenty-five and fifty, only three percent of men and less than 
nine percent of women work between thirty-five and forty hours per week.  See WILLIAMS ET AL., 
supra note 69, at 30. 
80 See generally Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 66; see also Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra 
note 69, at 412–25. 
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high percentages of workers who provided generally positive responses 
about the impact of compressed work schedules on work/family balance, 
the four-day work week may not be moving women much closer to 
achieving equality.81 
In the Gilbert and Vega study of patrol officers, for example, actual 
work/family benefits may not be reflected simply by the fact that, when 
specifically asked to rate the degree to which a compressed schedule 
affected their ability to devote time to family members, 85.3% of the 
nearly all-male respondents reported that it had made it “‘easier’ or ‘much 
easier’” to do so.82  When the patrol officers were asked in an open-ended 
question to identify what they found to be the most favorable aspect of the 
compressed work week, 88.3% said that it gave them a greater opportunity 
to participate in off-duty employment—in other words, that a compressed 
work week allowed them to take a second paid job.83  To the extent that 
male workers use the scheduling flexibility of a compressed work week to 
take on additional paid work, rather than to share a greater proportion of 
family caregiving, a critical component of many women’s work/family 
conflicts will remain unaddressed. 
A detailed assessment of the earlier 1970 study of four-day workers at 
thirteen different firms, which is described above, raises similar concerns.  
Although seventy-five percent of the workers surveyed reported spending 
more time with their families when working a four-day rather than a five-
day work week, the study also found that the four-day work week 
“contributes significantly to moonlighting,” particularly for men.84  The 
percentage of respondents who reported holding a second job quadrupled 
from four percent when working a five-day work week to seventeen 
percent after moving to a compressed four-day schedule.85  The researchers 
believe that these percentages likely under-report the actual level of 
moonlighting, based on worker responses to interview questions regarding 
co-worker behavior and the fact that many of the employers had an express 
policy of firing workers for taking a second job.86 
                                                                                                                          
81 For reflections on the issue of gender equality in the context of the four-day work week 
appearing in this Symposium Issue, see generally Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexibility, 
42 CONN. L. REV. 1203 (2010). 
82 Vega & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 394–95.  The respondents were ninety-seven percent male, 
which reflected the demographics of the patrol division at that time.  Id. at 394. 
83 Id. at 395.  During the first year that the patrol officers worked the three-day, forty-hour 
schedule, they reported performing a similar number of hours on off-duty jobs as in the prior year while 
working a traditional five-day, forty-hour schedule.  Id. at 400.  Thus, it is unclear whether the 
perceived opportunity to increase paid work actually translated into increased participation in the paid 
labor market, at least in the period immediately following implementation of the three-day schedule. 
84 See Steele & Poor, supra note 31, at 105, 110, 115. 
85 Id. at 105, 109–10.  The percentage of workers in the study who reported holding a second job 
while working a five-day work week was similar to the percentage of second job holders in the 
American labor force generally, which at the time of the study was five percent.  Id. 
86 Id. 
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Most importantly, the study found that although the increase in 
moonlighting existed for both women and men, it was more pronounced 
with men.  Twenty percent of the male respondents, but only ten percent of 
the female respondents, reported engaging in additional paid work after 
moving to the four-day work week.87  Conversely, when respondents were 
asked in an open-ended question to name the advantages of working a 
four-day work week, some of the women—but none of the men—said that 
the four-day work week gave them an extra day to perform housework.88  
Similarly, among the respondents who had started work at their firms after 
the four-day work week was already in place, some of the women—but 
none of the men—said that they chose the job because the four-day work 
week gave them more time to devote to housework and family.89  While 
these data do not negate the fact that the majority of both women and men 
found that the four-day work week enabled increased time with family, the 
findings do suggest that the four-day work week is unlikely to move 
workers much closer to a dual-earner, dual-carer model, which many 
work/family advocates believe is critical to achieving gender equality.90 
Of course, for low-income families, the ability of a compressed work 
week to allow workers, particularly men, to work a second paid job may be 
more important than equalizing the gendered division of labor, to the 
extent that insufficient family income is itself a major source of 
work/family stress.  In the Vega and Gilbert study, for example, many of 
the patrol officers viewed the compressed work week as providing an 
important opportunity to supplement their low salaries.91  Nevertheless, 
this research provides a more nuanced understanding of the particular ways 
in which the four-day work week can and cannot address the variety of 
sources that contribute to work/family conflict. 
These findings regarding compressed work schedules are consistent 
with results from the Bohen and Viveros-Long study, described above, on 
the effects of flextime in federal agencies under the AWSA.  One of the 
study’s objectives was “to see if husbands and wives divided family work 
more equally in their families when one spouse had a flexitime option.”92  
The researchers found that flextime “does not appear to encourage men to 
share home chores or child rearing with their wives,” as the male workers 
reported engaging in the same percent of the family’s domestic work, 
                                                                                                                          
87 Id. at 105, 110. 
88 Id. at 105, 111. 
89 Id. at 108. 
90 See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR 
RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 85–86 (2003). 
91 See Vega & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 395. 
92 BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 135. 
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whether they were on a flextime or a traditional schedule.93 
Thus, as a whole, the research that attempts either to identify the 
workers most likely to benefit from a four-day work week or to assess the 
actual behavioral changes that a four-day work week is likely to produce 
should temper the initial enthusiasm that a four-day work week might 
otherwise engender among work/family advocates.  While this research 
raises serious questions about the extent to which a four-day work week is 
likely to assist those most in need, there is one particular group of workers 
for whom a four-day work week holds very real promise for ameliorating 
acute work/family conflicts.  This group is made up of shift workers who 
regularly perform some or all of their work outside of normal business 
hours.94 
Many studies have found that shift workers—even those working at or 
near forty hours per week—frequently experience both harmful health 
effects and high levels of work/family conflict.95  Many shift workers, 
particularly in the healthcare, police services, manufacturing, and energy 
industries, find the negative effects from working asocial hours 
compounded by highly unstable schedules on rotating, variable, or 
irregular shifts.96  Because shift workers often work forty-hour work 
weeks—albeit forty highly undesirable hours each week—their jobs have 
provided a useful laboratory for experimenting with compressed work 
schedules.  A large set of studies has found that many shift workers 
experience meaningful improvements in their ability to balance work and 
family by transitioning to various forms of compressed work weeks.97  
This is particularly the case when the compressed work schedule not only 
frees up additional days where no work is performed, but also regularizes 
working hours.98 
Although the research on shift workers is very encouraging, the 
potentially limited population of workers whose severe work/family 
conflicts are likely to be addressed through a four-day work week might 
                                                                                                                          
93 See id. at 135, 137; see also Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306–07 (describing the 
Bohen and Viveros-Long study and concluding that flextime was “insufficient to . . . alter household 
labor equity for those women who already had a high level of objective family-work conflicts and 
stressors to manage”). 
94 See Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 765. 
95 See id. at 764; Jennifer A. Warren & Phyllis J. Johnson, The Impact of Workplace Support on 
Work-Family Role Strain, 44 FAM. REL. 163, 164 (1995). 
96 See Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 766 (describing the industries most likely to employ shift 
workers); Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 313 (noting that “‘forced flexibility’ such as 
nonstandard, shift, or rotating work hours is associated with low wages, poor job security, and health 
risks”); Warren & Johnson, supra note 95, at 164 (finding an association between irregular and variable 
shifts and high levels of work/family conflict). 
97 See Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 766, 768–73 (conducting a meta-analysis of forty studies of 
the effect that a compressed work week has on the work/family balance of shift-workers and 
concluding that the majority of studies found improved work/family balance after the compressed work 
week was introduced). 
98 See id. at 764–73. 
 1242 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1223 
lead work/family advocates to prioritize other policy initiatives.  A unique 
confluence of other concerns, however, including the economic crisis, 
environmental pressures to reduce oil consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions, and increasing commute times, have all contributed to an 
immediate focus on expanding and experimenting with four-day work 
weeks and other compressed schedule designs.  Work/family advocates 
should not miss this opportunity to play an active role in shaping the 
debate over the use, design, and potential legal regulation of the four-day 
work week to maximize its effectiveness as a work/family balance tool.  
The research on shift workers provides some initial insight into at least one 
important design criteria by highlighting the significance of scheduling 
predictability.  Other research additionally has documented the importance 
of voluntary participation and worker control in ensuring that flexible work 
schedules are indeed “family-friendly.”99  Part III considers how potential 
legal regulation of the four-day work week might best incorporate these 
insights, as well as considering what lessons existing regulation in this 
context might reveal about regulatory reform efforts around workplace 
flexibility more generally. 
III.  A COLLECTIVE REFLEXIVE APPROACH TO REGULATING                       
THE FOUR-DAY WORK WEEK 
Work/family discourse about the legal regulation of workplace 
flexibility has focused primarily on three general approaches.  This section 
briefly summarizes those approaches and considers how they might apply 
in the context of the four-day work week.  This section then highlights an 
under-developed variant of one of those approaches and considers what it 
might offer to work/family advocates who are interested in finding 
regulatory methods to maximize the effectiveness of compressed work 
schedules as a work/family balance tool. 
The first general approach for regulating workplace flexibility is a 
traditional “command-and-control” strategy that relies on prescriptive rules 
with sanctions for non-compliance.100  This form of “top-down” regulation 
is typically outcomes-oriented, often focusing on expanding substantive 
                                                                                                                          
99 See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 313. 
100 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized 
Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 64 
(describing this as a “proscriptive rule-oriented” approach to regulating employer conduct); Cynthia 
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 
328 (2005) (describing this approach as relying on the “enactment and centralized enforcement of 
uniform rules and standards”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A 
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475 (2001) (describing this as a “rule-enforcement 
approach” that “treats regulation as punishing violations of predefined legal rules”). 
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rights and responsibilities.101  Reasonable accommodation mandates are 
one example of this approach.102 
The use of top-down substantive legal rules has been criticized on a 
variety of grounds.103  Many commentators describe this type of regulatory 
strategy as a “one-size-fits-all” approach that fails to recognize not only the 
diverse interests of stakeholders (e.g., the heterogeneous needs of workers 
with caregiving responsibilities),104 but also fails to recognize the validity 
of private economic concerns.105  Commentators have been particularly 
skeptical about the ability of top-down regulatory methods to address 
subtle structural and organizational sources of gender discrimination in the 
workplace, including inflexible schedules and other working time norms.  
Specifically, scholars have highlighted the difficulty of crafting substantive 
rules that are appropriately responsive to complex workplace dynamics and 
relationships,106 the risk of judicial capture of substantive mandates,107 and 
the inability of command-and-control regulations to stimulate viable, 
                                                                                                                          
101 See Lobel, supra note 11, at 344–45; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 28–29 
(distinguishing traditional proposals for regulating workplace flexibility by expanding substantive 
rights from alternative process-based approaches); Simon Deakin & Colm McLaughlin, The Regulation 
of Women’s Pay: From Individual Rights to Reflexive Law?, in WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT: 
CHANGING LIVES AND NEW CHALLENGES 313, 319–20 (Jacqueline Scott et al. eds., 2008) (describing 
command-and-control approaches as “prescriptive” and outcomes-oriented, in contrast to “reflexive” 
regulation that is process-based and “validates a range of potential solutions”). 
102 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 28, 45. 
103 See Estlund, supra note 100, at 340–41. 
104 See Lobel, supra note 11, at 380–81; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 29–30, 45 
(arguing that procedural legal mandates may “achieve individually tailored solutions that may in some 
instances prove superior to what could be achieved under externally imposed substantive mandates,” 
which often lack the ability “to address the divergent needs and circumstances of all caregivers”). 
105 See Lobel, supra note 11, at 379–80; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 43–44 
(questioning “the normative basis for placing additional responsibilities on employers”). 
106 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 36–42, 65 (analyzing the limits of re-interpreting 
antidiscrimination mandates as a means of increasing workplace flexibility for caregivers and 
concluding that “[i]t is extraordinarily difficult to envision an appropriately responsive method of direct 
regulation” to address second-generation workplace exclusion); Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace 
Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 661 (2003) (arguing 
that “the contextual nature of the problem of modern workplace discrimination requires a similarly 
contextualized solution,” and that “[t]here simply is no single answer that will work in all organizations 
to eliminate institutionalized forms of discrimination”); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and 
Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 629 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture] (arguing that 
“discriminatory work cultures are too complex and too intertwined with valuable social relations to be 
easily regulated through judicial pronouncements and direct regulation”); Tristin K. Green & 
Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 HAST. L.J. 1435, 
1436, 1454–56 (2008) (describing how traditional antidiscrimination mandates may inhibit employers’ 
ability to address “relational sources of discrimination”); Sturm, supra note 100, at 475 (explaining 
why the complexity, subtlety, and contextualized nature of “second generation” workplace 
discrimination “cannot be reduced to a fixed code of specific rules or commands”). 
107 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 476, 485–87 (2000); see also Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of 
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 21–46 (2005) [hereinafter Travis, 
Recapturing] (describing the process of judicial capture of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s 
reasonable accommodation mandate and of Title VII’s disparate impact theory). 
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individually-tailored solutions.108 In addition, because traditional 
substantive rule making “presupposes an adversarial relationship between 
worker and employer,” this approach often encourages employers to focus 
on short-term strategies for avoiding liability rather than on engaging in 
creative problem solving to address the structural and organizational 
sources of work/family conflict.109  As a result, top-down regulatory 
strategies are unlikely to engender in employers the necessary commitment 
to social change upon which a work/family agenda ultimately depends.110 
The second general approach to increasing workplace flexibility lies at 
the other end of the spectrum from command-and-control strategies.  This 
is the market-based governance approach, which relies not on legal 
intervention, but on making the market work more efficiently as a 
laboratory for workplace flexibility.111  This approach often focuses on 
making the business case for workplace flexibility and maximizing 
information exchange to facilitate employers’ voluntary experimentation 
with working time innovation.112  This approach is being used by 
organizations such as the Project for Attorney Retention, A Better Balance, 
and others, which disseminate research, provide training, and conduct 
outreach to educate employers about how flexible hour arrangements may 
produce financial benefits through reduced turnover, increased 
productivity, lower absenteeism, and enhanced recruiting.113 
In the context of the four-day work week, this market-based approach 
is illustrated by the “Diversity & Flexibility Connection” initiative recently 
undertaken by a dozen major corporations seeking greater diversity among 
                                                                                                                          
108 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 29. 
109 See id. at 67; see also Sturm, supra note 100, at 475–76 (observing that top-down regulation 
“induces firms to adopt strategies that reduce the short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies 
that address the underlying problem”). 
110 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 29. 
111 See Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and 
Responsibility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 574, 582–85 (2007) (describing the market-based 
governance approach). 
112 See id.; see also WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 73, at 88–93 (describing 
evidence of the business case for increased workplace flexibility); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 107, 
at 12 (summarizing evidence of the potential financial benefits from workplace flexibility). 
113 Information about the Project for Attorney Retention is available at http://www.pardc.org/, 
which includes links to various reports and best practice guides for employers to implement cost-
effective flexible-hour and reduced-hour policies.  Specific examples of attempts to use the business 
case for flexibility as a way to alter employers’ behavior are readily available online.  See, e.g., ANNA 
DANZIGER & SHELLEY WATERS, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR FLEXIBLE 
WORK ARRANGEMENTS 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibility 
2010/definition/documents/BusinessCaseforFWAs.pdf; DANA E. FRIEDMAN, FAMILIES & WORK INST., 
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR COMPANIES 1–5, available at http://www.familiesandwork. 
org/3w/tips/downloads/companies.pdf; JENNIFER E. SWANBERG ET AL., CITISALES STUDY ISSUE BRIEF 
NO. 3, CAN BUSINESS BENEFIT BY PROVIDING WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY TO HOURLY WORKERS? 1–6, 
available at http://www.citisalesstudy.com/_pdfs/IB3-HourlyWorkers.pdf; A Better Balance, Fact 
Sheet: The Business Case for Workplace Flexibility, http://abetterbalance.org/cms/index2.php?option= 
com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=24&Itemid=99999999 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010). 
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the attorneys employed by their outside law firms.114  These corporations 
voluntarily began to demand that their outside law firms demonstrate a 
commitment to flexible work policies, often by including on their legal 
accounts at least one part-time attorney (often someone on a four-day work 
week), as a condition for securing their legal business.115  In addition to 
directing their business to law firms that are committed to workplace 
flexibility, the companies’ general counsel have been educating law firms 
about the costs that clients incur from attorney attrition caused by a long-
hour work culture that expects employees to be available seven days per 
week.116 
Although many work/family advocates have been focusing increased 
attention on these types of educational campaigns, commentators have 
widely criticized reliance on purely market-based approaches to address 
employees’ work/family conflicts.117  Most scholars view the market as 
insufficient, on its own, to achieve meaningful progress toward workplace 
justice, equality, or flexibility, due to imperfect information, the effects of 
cognitive biases, and other sources of market inefficiencies.118  Scholars 
have identified a variety of reasons why employers may not respond to the 
growing evidence of a link between workplace flexibility and business 
efficiency.119  For example, many firms lack the necessary “organizational 
systems” that would allow them to identify the ways in which workplace 
flexibility might produce financial gains, either at the workplace level or 
on an individual employee basis.120  These structural and procedural 
deficiencies in obtaining relevant information are exacerbated by most 
employers’ focus on short-term cost-benefit measures, rather than on 
measures of long-term economic and productivity gains.121  In addition, 
there are some situations in which work/family objectives and efficiency 
simply conflict and external legal regulation is therefore necessary to 
                                                                                                                          
114 See Karen Sloan, Companies Push for Flexible Schedules To Boost Women Attorneys, 
LAW.COM, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202436003132. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. 
117 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 67. 
118 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 100, at 478. 
119 See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 55, 67–68 (explaining why synergies between 
family-friendly workplace practices and economic business interests “are not likely to be achieved 
wholly through market forces”); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 107, at 9–21 (analyzing the role of 
cognitive bias in employment decision making to help “explain why data revealing the economic 
benefits of flexible work arrangements have not produced significant changes by presumably 
economically efficient employers”). 
120 See Sturm, supra note 100, at 478; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 55, 67–68 
(explaining that a “necessary precondition” for employers to recognize potential financial gains from 
workplace flexibility “is the creation of a safe forum in which to identify and explore change,” and in 
which an employer and an employee “can educate each other through an objective process”). 
121 See Sturm, supra note 100, at 478; see also Travis, Recapturing, supra note 107, at 89 (noting 
the importance of focusing on long-term cost-benefit analysis when assessing the economic gains that 
employers might realize from workplace accommodations). 
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ensure that workers with caregiving responsibilities are not discriminated 
against or excluded in the pursuit of rational economic objectives.122 
In between these two primary approaches to addressing workplace 
flexibility—either through top-down rule making or market-based 
methods—lies the “new governance” approach, which instead emphasizes 
public oversight of private, regulatory initiatives.123  The new governance 
approach often relies on various forms of “reflexive law,” which focus on 
imposing procedural rather than substantive obligations to facilitate 
business self-regulation.124  The new governance scholars have made a 
compelling case that this middle-ground approach may provide a viable 
solution to the shortcomings of both top-down substantive rules and of 
imperfect market mechanisms by recognizing that “economic efficiency 
and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.”125 
Several examples of new governance strategies come from the United 
Kingdom, which has been a leader in experimenting with reflexive legal 
regulation in the workplace.  One example is a U.K. Code of Practice that 
gives individual employees the right to request certain information from 
their employers to help them assess their relative compensation when they 
believe that they may be experiencing sex-based pay discrimination.126  
                                                                                                                          
122 See Sturm, supra note 100, at 478; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 67 (suggesting 
that “the business case for flexible and other employee-friendly management practices may be 
somewhat overstated”); Selmi, supra note 111, at 583–85 (arguing that “there are very little reliable 
data to support the productivity benefits of flexible workplaces,” and that advocates have inadequately 
explained “why more employers have not adopted flexible workplace practices” if they are indeed 
“efficient”). 
123 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 63–74; Lobel, supra note 11, at 344–45; see also 
Estlund, supra note 100, at 377–83 (proposing a system of monitored employer self-regulation as an 
alternative to top-down enforcement of labor standards); Green, Work Culture, supra note 106, at 627–
29, 664–83 (proposing a set of “legal incentives that will facilitate contextual problem solving by 
employers” as a more effective way to regulate discriminatory work cultures than relying “on courts to 
articulate and enforce specific, across-the-board rules”); Sturm, supra note 100, at 553–67 (proposing 
regulatory reforms that focus on incentivizing employers to voluntarily adopt structural problem-
solving methods to address workplace discrimination). 
124 See Deakin & McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 313–14, 319–20; Lobel, supra note 11, at 345; 
see also Michelle A. Travis, Employment Protection for Atypical Workers: Proceedings of the 2006 
Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment 
Law, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 233, 266–69 (2006) [hereinafter Travis, Atypical Workers] 
(describing the “shift in codifying rights in terms of process, rather than substantive outcomes”); 
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans With Disabilities Act 
Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 356 n.273 (2009) [hereinafter Travis, 
Lashing Back] (noting “the recent scholarly trend to promote the value of process-based solutions for 
reducing employment discrimination and advancing worker rights”); Travis, Work-Family Policy, 
supra note 69, at 425–29 (considering the role that reflexive law might play in a work/family policy 
agenda).  
125 Lobel, supra note 11, at 344.  See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 67 (describing 
procedural mandates as “a possible middle ground” that might address “the dichotomous tension 
between substantive regulation and deregulated markets”). 
126 See Deakin & McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 317–18 (describing the Code of Practice on 
Equal Pay, issued by the United Kingdom’s Equal Opportunities Commission in 2003 to help ensure 
compliance with laws prohibiting sex-based compensation discrimination); see also generally EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, CODE OF PRACTICE ON EQUAL PAY, available at http://www.equality 
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While providing no new substantive entitlements, this procedural right 
enables an individual employee to obtain—and an employer to pay 
appropriate attention to—relevant information about workplace 
inequalities. 
More relevant to the four-day work week is the United Kingdom’s 
Employment Act of 2002127 and its related Flexible Working 
Regulations128 (collectively, the “U.K. Employment Act”).  The U.K. 
Employment Act grants certain employees the right to request a change in 
the number of hours, times, or days in their work schedule,129 and it 
prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for making such a 
request.130  This law would protect, for example, an employee who asks for 
a four-day work week schedule.  This “right to request” does not entitle 
employees to any particular outcome regarding their working hours.  
Instead, it establishes a mandatory procedure ensuring that the employer 
will meaningfully consider the employee’s request.131 
Under the U.K. Employment Act, an employee must initiate the 
process by filing with an employer a detailed written request for a specific 
alternative work schedule that addresses, among other things, how to 
mitigate any anticipated effects that the proposed schedule might have on 
                                                                                                                          
humanrights.com/uploaded_files/code_of_practice_equalpay.pdf.  While the Code of Practice on Equal 
Pay is not binding law, an employer’s failure to comply with its provisions is admissible evidence 
before a legal tribunal in cases alleging sex-based compensation discrimination.  See CODE OF 
PRACTICE ON EQUAL PAY, supra, at 2, ¶3.  The Code provides that “[a] woman is entitled to write to 
her employer asking for information that will help her establish whether she has received equal pay and 
if not, what the reasons for the pay difference are.”  Id. at 9, ¶37.  The government has provided a 
standard form, known as “The Equal Pay Questionnaire,” which an employee may use for this purpose 
either before filing a legal claim or within twenty-one days after filing.  Id.  If an employer fails to 
respond to the request within eight weeks (without a reasonable excuse), or if an employer provides “an 
evasive or equivocal reply,” a legal tribunal may infer that the employer has no legitimate basis for an 
identified pay difference.  See id. at 9, ¶38. 
127 Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.) (adding § 8A to the Employment Rights Act, 1996, 
c. 18 (U.K.)). 
128 The Flexible Working (Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 
2002/3236 (U.K.); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/3207 
(U.K.). 
129 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80F(1) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act, 
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)).  Eligible employees include those who have worked for their employer 
continuously for twenty-six weeks and who have a child under age six or a disabled child under age 
eighteen, or who are providing care for an adult relative.  Equality and Human Rights Commission, 
Family Friendly Working: What the Law Says, http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/your-rights/ 
gender/sex-discrimination-your-rights-at-work/family-friendly-working/family-friendly-working-what-
the-law-says/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
130 The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/3207, art. 16 
(U.K.). 
131 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 75–78 (describing the U.K. Employment Act to 
illustrate process-based regulation that does not obligate an employer to adopt any particular work 
schedule, but instead requires the employer to “seriously consider the request”); Travis, Atypical 
Workers, supra note 124, at 266–68 (describing the U.K. Employment Act as an example of process-
based regulation to initiate meaningful consideration of workplace flexibility requests). 
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the employer’s operations.132  An employer must respond to an employee’s 
request for a four-day work week or other alternative work schedule within 
twenty-eight days, either by granting the request or by setting up an 
individual meeting with the employee to discuss the request.133  The 
employer must notify the employee of its final decision within fourteen 
days of the meeting.134  If the employer denies the employee’s request, it 
must provide a written response that identifies one or more reasons for the 
denial from a specific list of business-related grounds enumerated in the 
Act.135  The enumerated reasons include, among others, that the 
employee’s request would make the employer unable to meet customer 
demands, or that there would be insufficient work available during the 
hours that the employee wants to work.136 
Within fourteen days of receiving the employer’s final response, an 
employee may file an internal appeal with the employer seeking review of 
a denial.137  The employer must meet with the employee to discuss the 
appeal and must provide a written response to the appeal within fourteen 
days of that meeting.138  The employee then may appeal an employer’s 
denial to an outside tribunal, but only on very limited grounds.139  The 
outside tribunal will defer to the employer’s business judgment and will 
assess only whether the employer followed the statutory procedure, 
whether the employer’s basis for denying the employee’s request included 
at least one of the statutorily-enumerated reasons, and whether the 
employer’s denial was based on erroneous facts.140 
                                                                                                                          
132 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80F(2) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act, 
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)).  See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76–77 (describing the 
information that an employee must include in a request for an alternative work schedule under the U.K. 
Employment Act). 
133 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(a) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act, 
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 
2002/3207, art. 3 (U.K.). 
134 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(b) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment 
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, 
S.I. 2002/3207, art. 4 (U.K.). 
135 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(c) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act, 
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 
2002/3207, art. 5 (U.K.). 
136 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(1)(b) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment 
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)). 
137 Id. § 80G(2)(d); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 
2002/3207, art. 6 (U.K.). 
138 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(g)–(h) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment 
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, 
S.I. 2002/3207, arts. 8–10 (U.K.). 
139 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80H(1) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act, 
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 
2002/3207, art. 15 (U.K.). 
140 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80H(1) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act, 
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 
2002/3207, art. 15 (U.K.). 
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New governance scholars have praised the U.K. Employment Act as a 
useful model for how reflexive laws may help develop organizational 
practices to overcome the information deficiencies that render purely 
market-based mechanisms suspect.141  Nevertheless, work/family 
advocates who are familiar with the often deep institutional resistance to 
working time innovation rightfully may be skeptical of a law that imposes 
no substantive obligations on employers.  The promise of the U.K. 
Employment Act, however, lies in its particular selection of steps 
governing the engagement of both sides in the process.142  Those steps are 
designed to help facilitate the exchange of relevant information to 
maximize the chances of identifying “mutually beneficial” solutions.143  
Unlike top-down regulatory methods, the U.K. Employment Act’s process-
based approach at least has the potential to encourage jointly-designed, 
individually-tailored work schedules that are more responsive both to 
employees’ diverse work/family circumstances and to employers’ diverse 
business needs.144 
Preliminary studies on the U.K. Employment Act provide some reason 
for optimism.145  Research indicates that the number of employee requests 
for alternative work schedules has increased since the law was enacted and 
that employers voluntarily approve the majority of requests made by 
eligible employees.146  In addition, most employers report that compliance 
with the “right to request” procedures is not prohibitively costly.147  The 
U.K. Employment Act thus provides a potentially useful model for 
work/family advocates when considering how legal regulation might be 
employed in the United States to maximize the work/family benefits of 
compressed work schedules. 
One of the most important examples of a reflexive regulatory proposal 
in the United States is Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman’s thoughtful 
articulation of an “incentivized organizational justice model” for future 
                                                                                                                          
141 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76; Travis, Atypical Workers, supra note 124, at 268. 
142 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76. 
143 See id.  In this way, the U.K. Employment Act’s procedures are similar to the “interactive 
process” that is envisioned as part of employers’ compliance with the reasonable accommodation 
mandate in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).  See id. at 50–56; see also Travis, 
Lashing Back, supra note 124, at 356–66 (describing how the ADA’s interactive process has stamped a 
“procedural footprint in the workplace,” which facilitates relevant information exchange that “may 
allow employers and employees to identify workplace modifications that will produce joint long-term 
benefits”); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes,” 55 
VAND. L. REV. 481, 576–77 (2002) (explaining how the ADA’s interactive process may provide a 
“built-in laboratory” to help reduce cognitive biases that contribute to certain forms of workplace 
discrimination). 
144 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 78. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. 
147 See id. 
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work/family legislation.148  Rather than granting or expanding substantive 
accommodation rights to workers with caregiving responsibilities, Arnow-
Richman’s proposal would grant individual employees a new procedural 
right.149  This right would obligate an employer to engage in a good faith 
interactive process to meaningfully discuss an employee’s request for an 
alternative work schedule.150  Unlike the U.K. Employment Act, this 
proposal would rely on a more flexible “good faith” responsibility, rather 
than mandating the specific content of the interactive process.151  An 
employer’s failure to satisfy this responsibility would subject the employer 
to monetary penalties to ensure that the “procedural obligations provide 
meaningful incentives in their own right.”152 
Professor Arnow-Richman suggests that one way to implement this 
general model would be to amend the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”), which currently grants covered employees at large employers 
the substantive right to job-protected unpaid leave for specifically-defined 
caregiving events.153  While the FMLA does not generally require an 
employer to provide alternative work schedules, Arnow-Richman’s 
proposal would obligate an employer to at least discuss such arrangements 
when an employee experiences a qualifying caregiving event and when the 
                                                                                                                          
148 See id. at 27–29, 56–62.  In this Symposium Issue, Professor Arnow-Richman further develops 
her proposal for using law to encourage and mediate employers’ voluntary and individual 
accommodation efforts through statutory procedural rights that enable and protect caregivers who seek 
alternative work arrangements.  See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The 
Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Family Balance, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 1081 (2010). 
149 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 27–29, 56–62. 
150 See id. at 56–62.  This proposed obligation would be similar to the ADA’s interactive process 
obligation except that it would add monetary penalties for an employer’s failure to comply, regardless 
of the outcome on any underlying substantive claim.  See id. at 56 (explaining that her proposal “adopts 
the ADA interactive process concept, but makes the threat of a procedural violation meaningful through 
the imposition of a statutory fee”). 
151 See id. at 76. 
152 Id. at 54, 56–58. 
153 Id. at 30, 56–58.  The FMLA covers employees who have worked for their employer for at 
least twelve months and 1250 hours during the prior twelve-month period, if the employer is engaged 
in commerce and has employed fifty or more employees for a specified time period.  29 U.S.C. § 
2611(2)(A), 2611(4)(A) (2006).  The FMLA provides such employees the right to unpaid, job-
protected leaves for specified time periods for the birth, adoption, or foster care placement of a new 
child, to provide care for the serious health condition of an employee’s spouse, child, or parent, to 
attend to an employee’s own serious health condition, or to attend to specifically-defined needs of 
certain family members’ military obligations.  Id. §§ 2612(a), 2612(c), 2614(a).  Professor Arnow-
Richman’s proposal also would include a second component, which is “a judicially created burden shift 
on proof of substantive violations of the FMLA and Title VII in cases where employers fail to engage 
in a good-faith process and the plaintiff can demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation or 
discriminatory failure to accommodate.”  Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 56, 58–62.  This would 
ensure not just monetary penalties for failure to meet the procedural obligations, but litigation penalties 
as well. 
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employee returns from a covered leave.154  Although such an approach 
would retain the limited coverage of the FMLA, which excludes many 
employees, employers, and caregiving activities,155 Arnow-Richman 
correctly observes that it may be a more politically viable first step in 
experimenting with reflexive regulation in the United States, rather than 
immediately seeking new legislation that would cover a broader group of 
caregivers, as in the United Kingdom.156  Overall, Arnow-Richman’s 
proposal is an extremely significant one for work/family advocates who are 
seeking to most effectively regulate workplace flexibility.  Her proposal 
offers both the theoretical and practical foundation necessary to 
operationalize a reflexive law approach “to enhance worker voice and 
provide incentives for voluntary employer accommodation of 
caregiving.”157 
While these existing reflexive law models within the new governance 
approach have much to offer work/family advocates who are considering 
regulation of the four-day work week, the existing models share one 
potential limitation: they depend upon the creation and exercise of 
individual employee rights.  The existing models do not incorporate formal 
procedural mechanisms either for collective employee action or for 
collective information exchange between employers and relevant groups of 
employees within the workplace.  The models instead rely upon individual 
employees to initiate and participate in the process.  For these models to 
work, individual employees must be aware of and understand their 
procedural rights, be aware of and understand the legal remedies available 
to protect them when exercising their procedural rights, and perceive those 
legal remedies as sufficient to overcome concerns about employer 
retaliation. 
                                                                                                                          
154 Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 56–57.  Currently, the FMLA only requires that the 
mandated unpaid leave periods be provided on an intermittent or reduced leave basis in very narrow 
circumstances.  See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b). 
155 Many scholars have criticized the FMLA for its limited coverage on a variety of different 
grounds.  See, e.g., Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act: 
Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 468–81 (2008) 
(explaining how the FMLA’s requirements have gender, class, and race effects); Naomi Gerstel & Amy 
Armenia, Giving and Taking Family Leaves: Right or Privilege?, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 166–
76 (2009) (demonstrating how the FMLA reinforces a family model primarily practiced by white, 
wealthy, heterosexual couples, and exacerbates inequalities based on marital status, sexuality, race, and 
class); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural 
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 
419–26 (2001) (describing how the FMLA’s coverage requirements, which are “premised upon the 
existence of the heterosexual, two-parent family,” end up excluding all but “the most privileged 
workers”); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 38–47 (2007) (explaining how the FMLA effectively excludes low-income workers 
from protection). 
156 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 57 n.142, 85–86; see also Travis, Lashing Back, supra 
note 124, at 355–66 (explaining how individual procedural rights for some employees can stamp a 
“procedural footprint in the workplace,” which ends up benefiting other employees as well). 
157 Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 27. 
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Under the right circumstances, it is possible that individual process 
rights might indirectly facilitate collective employee action or collective 
information exchange within a workplace.  Nothing in the existing models 
would prevent individual employees from sharing information about the 
employer that they receive through individual participation in the 
process.158  Nor would the existing models prevent employers from 
aggregating information that they receive from individual employees.  In 
addition, while Professor Arnow-Richman acknowledges that individual 
procedural rights are “hardly a substitute for traditional bargaining,” she 
also describes how such rights might at least create “a framework for 
collective action.”159  The process of learning about a new individual right, 
and of naming and claiming such a right, can itself be a social endeavor 
that connects individual employees within a workplace in meaningful 
ways.160 Arnow-Richman suggests that this process might help 
employees—as a group—begin questioning and delegitimizing unilateral 
employer acts, which eventually may encourage more explicitly concerted 
employee action.161 
Some of the existing models of individual reflexive rights contain 
modest elements that might facilitate these potential collective effects.  The 
U.K. Employment Act, for example, permits an individual employee to 
bring a trusted colleague to all of the meetings that the individual has with 
the employer to discuss the employee’s request for an alternative work 
schedule.162  The Act also requires that an individual employee’s initial 
proposal for an alternative work schedule contain certain information, 
which sometimes requires the employee to consult with co-workers.163  
Specifically, an employee’s initial written application must not only 
identify the employee’s desired work schedule, but also must address how 
to mitigate any anticipated affects that the proposed schedule might have 
on the employer’s operations.164  If the proposed work schedule would 
affect co-workers, the Act contemplates that the individual employee might 
need to obtain feedback from those co-workers to address the operational 
impact component in the employee’s request.165  While this requirement 
                                                                                                                          
158 In the context of the ADA’s interactive process, several authors have explained how 
employees can benefit by sharing information that they receive from engaging in the process.  See, e.g., 
RUTH O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE ETHIC OF CARE 113 
(2005); Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 858 (2008); Travis, 
Lashing Back, supra note 124, at 366. 
159 Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 70. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(k) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment 
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, 
S.I. 2002/3207, art. 14 (U.K.). 
163 See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76–77. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. at 77. 
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thus might encourage discussions among employees, such detailed and 
challenging requirements for an employee to even initiate the process 
simultaneously highlight the risk that not all employees will be able to 
access individual-based process rights.166 
Despite some of the positive research results regarding individual 
employees’ use of the U.K. Employment Act, more general research in the 
United Kingdom legitimates this concern by questioning the ability of 
individual reflexive laws to advance women’s workplace equality.  Based 
on empirical studies of the British experience, several researchers recently 
have concluded that reflexive regulation is unlikely to achieve gender 
equality goals unless unions or other employee organizations jointly 
manage the process that the reflexive law creates.167  These researchers 
have concluded that one of the preconditions for individual reflexive laws 
to be effective is the existence of “bridging institutions,” which they 
describe as extra-legal structures for employee representation and 
workplace deliberation.168  These researchers emphasize the importance of 
having these deliberative mechanisms at the workplace level.169  Because 
such institutional prerequisites currently do not exist in most workplaces in 
either the United Kingdom or the United States, these researchers remain 
skeptical about the potential ability of individual reflexive law strategies to 
advance workplace equality.170 
Professors Vicki Schultz and Allison Hoffman have reached a similar 
conclusion in their thoughtful work advocating for a reduced-hour work 
week.171  Schultz and Hoffman have identified a variety of legislative 
incentives, negotiated solutions, and private industry initiatives that might 
be used to help achieve that goal.172  Similar to the British researchers, 
Schultz and Hoffman have concluded that anything other than private 
industry initiatives would require the development of “a stronger structure 
to bolster representation of employees’ interests for purpose of designing 
and enforcing corporate compliance.”173 
This research highlights the need for work/family advocates to 
                                                                                                                          
166 While setting a high standard for employees to initiate a workplace process is likely to 
constrict the availability of the right, it may also have some benefits, including that it effectively 
screens out “facially unreasonable requests,” and that “it sets the stage for constructive discussion 
between the parties” by “treat[ing] the employee as having a stake in and responsibility for the business 
as a whole.”  Id. 
167 See Deakin & McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 323. 
168 See id. at 320–21, 324, 326. 
169 See id. at 320, 324–25 (describing one form of reflexive law as imposing a default rule that 
allows the parties to negotiate variances to the statutory norm, and describing the opt-out as a failed 
version of this form because of the lack of “collective routes” for negotiation and “the ease with which 
employers could impose opt-outs on individual workers”). 
170 See id. at 323–26. 
171 See Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 66, at 144–49. 
172 See id. 
173 Id. at 147. 
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consider not just individual procedural rights, but to consider “collective 
reflexive” forms of regulation as well.  Collective reflexive laws would 
vest new procedural rights and establish mechanisms for information 
exchange at a group-based level, rather than relying exclusively on the 
creation and exercise of individual employee rights.  One barrier to such an 
approach is what Professor Arnow-Richman refers to as “the absence of 
obvious substantive tie-ins,”174 to which a procedural right could most 
easily be attached.  In the context of women’s employment equality and 
workplace flexibility, existing substantive rights are limited to the 
antidiscrimination mandate in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the 
narrow leave entitlements in the FMLA—both of which are framed in 
terms of individual employee rights. 
While the political viability of enacting new free-standing reflexive 
laws may indeed be questionable, there may be other routes for such 
experimentation beyond just attempting to add a new procedural obligation 
to an existing substantive right.  In the context of the four-day work week, 
two examples exist in which a substantive entitlement instead was used as 
a bargaining chip to facilitate the creation and design of new collective 
reflexive rights.  Those examples are California’s Workplace Flexibility 
Act and the Federal Alternative Work Schedules Act, which are described 
below. 
A.  The California Workplace Flexibility Act 
The first example of collective reflexive regulation comes from 
California, which is one of only a few states that provide most non-exempt 
employees with the substantive right to receive daily overtime premium 
pay.175  Under federal law, as well as most state laws, overtime premium 
                                                                                                                          
174 Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 85–86. 
175 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (West 2003) (establishing the basic daily overtime rules).  Various 
California wage orders exempt certain employees from the daily overtime obligations.  See, e.g., CAL. 
DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND INTERPRETATIONS 
MANUAL § 56.2.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSEManual/dlse_enfcmanual.pdf 
[hereinafter INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL] (noting that agricultural workers are allowed to work up to 
ten hours per day without an employer incurring overtime premium obligations).  Other states and 
territories that impose daily overtime obligations include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060 (2008) 
(requiring overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day); Colorado, Colorado Minimum 
Wage Order No. 25, 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-1 (2009) (requiring overtime premiums for hours 
over twelve in a single day); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 448.01 (West 2002) (requiring overtime premiums 
for hours over ten in a single day); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.018 (2006) (requiring 
overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day, except by mutual agreement in certain 
situations); Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 274 (2001) (requiring overtime premiums for hours 
over eight in a single day); and the Virgin Islands, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 20 (1997) (requiring 
overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day under certain circumstances).  Some other states 
impose daily overtime requirements for employees in certain industries, occupations, or work sectors.  
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 652.020 (2007) (requiring daily overtime premiums in certain circumstances for 
certain employees at mills, logging camps, and manufacturing enterprises); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-5-
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rates are triggered only when an employee’s hours exceed forty in a single 
work week.176  In California, employers additionally are required to pay 
most of their non-exempt workers at a premium rate for all hours over 
eight in a single work day: at a rate of one and one-half times the regular 
rate of pay for hours over eight, and twice the regular rate of pay for hours 
over twelve.177  These daily overtime obligations create a financial 
disincentive for California employers to use compressed work weeks.  A 
California employer using a 4/10 schedule, for example, would incur 
overtime premium liability for eight hours each week that it would avoid 
by spreading the forty hours over a standard five-day, eight-hour-per-day 
schedule. 
To the extent that employers are otherwise motivated to experiment 
with four-day work weeks, daily overtime obligations effectively bring 
employees to the bargaining table with extra leverage.  In California’s 
political process, this leverage resulted in the enactment of the Eight-Hour-
Day Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999 (the “Workplace 
Flexibility Act”).178  The Workplace Flexibility Act essentially codified 
employees’ willingness to give up their daily overtime premiums only in 
exchange for obtaining some control over the adoption and design of a 
compressed work schedule.  The Workplace Flexibility Act is primarily a 
reflexive law, and it is unique in establishing collective employee control 
within private, non-organized workforce settings. 
Like other reflexive laws, the Workplace Flexibility Act largely 
establishes procedures, rather than substantive rights.  If an employer 
follows the established procedures, the employer may adopt a compressed 
work schedule that qualifies the employer for an exemption from some or 
                                                                                                                          
101 (2009) (requiring overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day for state and county 
employees). 
176 See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 778.102 (2009); see 
also supra note 175 (listing the small group of states that impose daily overtime premiums). 
177 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a).  
178 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 134 (A.B. 60) (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 500–58 
(West 2003)).  Former California Governor Gray Davis signed the law on July 20, 1999, and it became 
effective on January 1, 2000.  See Bette E. Robin, The Impact of the New Alternative Work Schedule on 
Dental Offices, 29 J. CAL. DENTAL ASS’N 289, 289 (2001).  The Act was in response to the California 
Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC”) elimination of daily overtime obligations in 1998, which 
was itself a response to former California Governor Pete Wilson’s efforts to eliminate the state’s daily 
overtime obligations.  See Tyler M. Paetkau, Time Off in California: State and Federal Laws on 
Employee Leave, Vacations and Holidays, LAWMEMO, http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/timeoff.htm 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Cal. Exec. Order Nos. W-75-94 (1994), W-84-94 (1994), W-142-97 (1997) 
(issued by Governor Pete Wilson to suspend daily overtime for certain workers); Letter from Pete 
Wilson, Governor of California, to Members of the Industrial Welfare Commission (Sept. 8, 1995), 
available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/Bulletin /Oct_Nov_95/IWC_Letter.html (requesting the repeal of 
daily overtime obligations).  The Workplace Flexibility Act authorized the IWC to issue implementing 
regulations, which the IWC has done in the form of various Wage Orders.  See CAL. LAB. CODE § 517 
(West 2003); see also Robin, supra, at 289–93 (describing the regulatory process). 
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all of the otherwise mandatory daily overtime obligations.179  The 
procedures apply not just to four-day work week schedules, but to “any 
regularly scheduled workweek requiring an employee to work more than 
eight hours in a 24-hour period.”180  Because the procedures focus 
primarily on groups of employees in “readily identifiable work unit[s],” 
and only secondarily on employees as individuals, the Workplace 
Flexibility Act indirectly provides affected employees with a collective 
voice over the adoption and design of compressed work schedules.181 
Under this collective reflexive approach, an employer must first submit 
a written proposal for a compressed work week to all employees in an 
affected work unit.182  The proposal must specify the number of days in the 
work week and the number of hours in each work shift that would be 
required under the proposed compressed schedule.183  The proposal may 
include either a single compressed work week option or a menu of 
compressed work schedules from which employees within a work unit 
would be permitted to choose.184 
The employer must then hold a secret ballot election for all employees 
within the work unit that would be affected by the proposed schedule.185  
The employer must hold the election during regular working hours at the 
employees’ work site.186  At least two-thirds of the employees in the 
affected work unit must vote in favor of the compressed work week for the 
schedule to become certified for a daily overtime exemption.187  At least 
fourteen days before the election, the employer must hold a meeting in 
which the employer provides to the employees in the affected work unit a 
written disclosure of how the proposed schedule would affect hours, 
                                                                                                                          
179 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a)(1); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a) (West Supp. 2010) 
(describing the procedures that an employer must follow to qualify a compressed work schedule for the 
daily overtime exemption authorized in CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a)(1)). 
180 See INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.24. 
181 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); see also id. § 511(i) (defining a “work unit” to include “a 
division, a department, a job classification, a shift, a separate physical location, or a recognized 
subdivision thereof”); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8.2 (describing the criteria for 
identifying a “work unit”).  The collective focus of the Workplace Flexibility Act may have been 
undermined by recent amendments in May 2009.  See Paul R. Lynd, California Adds Modest Flexibility 
to Alternative Workweek Schedules, EMP. L. ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP), May 15, 2009, at 1–2, 
available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Employment_Law_Alert_05_ 
15_09.pdf.  Those amendments clarified that a “work unit” may contain a single employee, as long as 
the single employee meets the general criteria for a work unit.  See 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2d Ex. Sess. 
Ch. 3 (A.B.5) (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(i)). 
182 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a) (requiring a “proposal” by the employer); INTERPRETATIONS 
MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.7.1 (requiring that the proposal be in writing). 
183 INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 56.7.1–.2. 
184 CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.7.2.1. 
185 CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8. 
186 INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8. 
187 CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8.1. 
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wages, and benefits.188  The employer must provide this written disclosure 
in multiple languages if more than five percent of the employees in the 
work unit primarily speak a language other than English.189  The employer 
must mail the written disclosure to any employees who do not attend the 
meeting.190 
The implementing regulations for the Workplace Flexibility Act 
include a variety of safeguards to help ensure that the results of an 
alternative work week election reflect the true desires of the employees in 
the work unit.  Although employers are free to express opinions regarding 
a compressed work schedule, employers are prohibited from intimidating 
or coercing employees to vote in a particular way.191  Employers may not 
engage in indirect coercion by ensuring that employees are absent from the 
election because adopting a proposed schedule requires not just two-thirds 
of the employees who actually vote, but two-thirds of all affected 
employees in a work unit.192  In addition to requiring a secret ballot to 
reduce the risk of individual retaliation, the law also prohibits an employer 
from reducing any employee’s regular rate of pay as the result of the 
overall election results.193 
If an employer follows these procedures and obtains the requisite two-
thirds affirmative vote by the employees in an affected work unit, the 
employer may adopt the proposed compressed work week without 
incurring all of the standard daily overtime obligations.194  Nothing in the 
Workplace Flexibility Act prohibits employers from unilaterally imposing 
a four-day work week or other form of compressed schedule without 
following any of these procedures—nor does it prohibit individual 
employees from unilaterally requesting such schedules—as long as the 
employer complies with standard daily overtime obligations.  The Act 
merely provides the incentive of avoiding standard daily overtime liability 
in exchange for following procedures that provide groups of employees 
with a voice in the process.  To obtain this benefit, the employer must 
report the results of the secret ballot election to a designated state agency 
within thirty days after the results are final, at which point the compressed 
work schedule becomes a qualified plan.195  For most occupational 
categories, a qualified compressed schedule exempts the employer from 
any daily overtime obligations for up to ten hours per day on scheduled 
                                                                                                                          
188 INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.10.  If the employer fails to comply with 
any of the disclosure procedures, the election will be invalid and will not entitle the employer to the 
overtime premium exemptions for its proposed compressed work schedule.  See id. § 56.10.1. 
189 Id. § 56.10. 
190 Id. 
191 See id. §§ 56.13, 56.13.2. 
192 See id. § 56.8.3. 
193 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 511(a), (c); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.11. 
194 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 510(a)(1), 511(a). 
195 See id. § 511(e). 
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work days.196  Employers would still be obligated to pay one and one-half 
the regular rate of pay for hours over ten and twice the regular rate of pay 
for hours over twelve on a scheduled work day, but an employer could use 
a 4/10 work week without incurring any overtime liability.197 
Once a compressed work week is certified under this procedure, 
employees also retain a collective right to repeal it.  If one-third of the 
affected employees in a work unit present a signed petition to the 
employer, the employer must hold another secret ballot election within 
thirty days to determine whether the work unit wants to repeal the 
compressed schedule.198  The same procedures that apply to the original 
election also apply to a repeal election, which requires an affirmative vote 
of at least two-thirds of the employees in the affected work unit for the 
repeal to succeed.199  An employer must comply with the repeal of a 
compressed work week within sixty days after the election is final, unless 
the employer can demonstrate to the governing state agency that doing so 
would impose an “undue hardship.”200  Elections either to adopt or to 
repeal a compressed schedule may not be held more frequently than once 
per year.201 
In addition to the collective procedural rights that are the primary focus 
of the Workplace Flexibility Act, the Act also contains a secondary level of 
individual accommodation rights for employees who were eligible to vote 
in a successful election but who are unable to work the compressed 
schedule due to caregiving or other obligations.202  The employer must 
make a “reasonable effort” to accommodate such employees by providing 
a work schedule that does not include more than eight hours per day.203  
This limited opt-out right provides some flexibility for employees whose 
work/family circumstances fit better within a more traditional work week 
schedule. 
In addition to addressing the critical component of employee choice 
and control, California’s Workplace Flexibility Act and its supporting 
regulatory wage orders also incorporate requirements that are responsive to 
                                                                                                                          
196 See id. § 511(a)–(b). 
197 See id.; see also Mitchell v. Yoplait, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 269–71 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 
2004) (upholding the validity of an alternative work week schedule that used three twelve-hour shifts 
and one six-hour shift, which only obligated the employer to pay time and one-half for the hours over 
ten in each of the twelve-hour days).  The overtime obligations are slightly different for some 
categories of workers, such as those in the healthcare industry.  See INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra 
note 175, § 56.3.2 (explaining that employees in the healthcare industry may agree to compressed work 
weeks that exempt an employer from any overtime obligations for up to twelve-hour days under certain 
circumstances). 
198 INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 56.17, 56.17.1, 56.17.2. 
199 See id. §§ 56.17.2, 56.17.3. 
200 Id. § 56.17.6. 
201 Id. § 56.17.4. 
202 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(d); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.19. 
203 CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(d); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.19. 
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a variety of work/family issues that might arise from a four-day work week 
or other compressed schedule.  For example, employers may not 
implement the compressed schedule after a valid election for at least thirty 
days,204 which gives employees time to modify their childcare 
arrangements before the change takes place.  For most occupational 
categories, the compressed schedule will not be certified unless it provides 
for at least four hours of work on any scheduled work day,205 which can 
reduce childcare challenges that may arise with very short-hour needs on 
particular days and very long-hour needs on others.  Most occupational 
categories also require the compressed schedule to contain at least two 
consecutive days off,206 which ensures that significant blocks of time will 
exist each week that may be dedicated to family-related activities.  The law 
also permits employers to allow employees to request a substitution of one 
regularly-scheduled work day for another similar-length work day to 
accommodate employees’ personal needs without losing the employer’s 
overtime exemption.207  That provision can provide flexibility for 
employees who need occasional schedule changes for unpredictable 
caregiving needs, such as a sick parent or child.  Although the Workplace 
Flexibility Act eliminates a significant component of the standard daily 
overtime obligations, it does not eliminate overtime premiums altogether, 
thereby retaining a disincentive for employers to design compressed 
schedules that include days over ten hours long, which can be particularly 
difficult from a childcare and family balance perspective.208 
The Workplace Flexibility Act also creates incentives for schedule 
predictability once the compressed schedule is in place, which often is 
crucial for employees who are trying to manage both work and family 
obligations.  Although an employer’s original proposal need only identify 
the number of days and hours per day that the compressed schedule will 
entail, the employer must assign each employee a “regularly-scheduled” 
shift with advance notice of the start and end times of each scheduled work 
day before the compressed schedule takes effect.209  The employer must 
give an employee at least one week’s notice before changing any 
                                                                                                                          
204 INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.17.8. 
205 See id. § 56.3.3. 
206 See id. § 56.4. 
207 See id. § 56.23.9. 
208 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a)–(b) (retaining the obligation to pay one and one-half the regular 
rate for hours over ten on a regularly-scheduled day and twice the regular rate for hours over twelve on 
a regularly-scheduled day). 
209 See INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.23; see also id. § 56.7.2 (specifying the 
required information in an alternative work week proposal and requiring the proposed schedule to have 
a specified number of “regularly recurring work days”); id. § 56.7.2.7 (noting that the statute “does not 
allow a situation where the employee may opt to work an alternative workweek or a normal workweek 
on an irregular basis for that would not meet the criteria of ‘regularly scheduled’”).  The regulations do 
permit a compressed schedule to differ from week to week, “so long as the schedule is regular and 
recurring,” for example, by having two different schedules that regularly alter weeks.  See id. § 56.7.3. 
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scheduled days or hours, and if schedule changes are more than 
“‘occasional’ occurrences,” the employer will lose its daily overtime 
exemption.210  Additionally, the Act imposes overtime liability when an 
employer requires an employee to work hours or days outside of the 
employee’s regular schedule.  For an employee working longer than eight 
hours in a day, the employer must pay one and one-half times the regular 
rate of pay for hours beyond those regularly scheduled that day, and twice 
the regular rate of pay for any such hours over twelve.211  The employer 
also must pay twice the regular rate of pay for any hours beyond eight on a 
non-regularly-scheduled day.212  Overall, these rules create incentives for 
an employer not to deviate from the established four-day work week or 
other qualified compressed work schedule. 
Not surprisingly, many employers’ representatives and business groups 
have criticized the Workplace Flexibility Act as antithetical to flexibility, 
and they have regularly lobbied for legislation that would make it easier for 
employers to avoid daily overtime obligations.213  These lobbying efforts 
recently have begun to incorporate work/family rhetoric by attempting to 
link employers’ desire to expand their ability to adopt four-day work 
weeks without incurring daily overtime premiums with an interest in 
“accommodat[ing] diverse family obligations.”214  The legislation proposed 
by these business groups, however, is striking in its general abandonment 
of the existing legal safeguards that recognize the importance of employee 
control, scheduling predictability, and other criteria for maximizing the 
work/family benefits of compressed work schedules. 
Despite reasons to be wary of the business community’s eleventh-hour 
interest in work/family balance as a motive for seeking to reduce daily 
overtime obligations, business representatives may be accurate in 
                                                                                                                          
210 See id. §§ 56.23.1, 56.23.2. 
211 CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(b); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.23.3. 
212 CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(b); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 56.23.3, 56.23.8. 
213 See, e.g., CalChamber Urges Support for Flexible Work Schedules, CALCHAMBER, Mar. 17, 
2008, http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/03172008ts.aspx (quoting a policy advocate for the 
California Chamber of Commerce who argued that the Workplace Flexibility Act “effectively 
eliminates most employers and employees from choosing alternative options,” because “[a]ny deviation 
from the rigidly controlled process voids the election and subjects the employer to potential lawsuits 
that can seek up to three years of back overtime pay for affected workers”); Paetkau, supra note 178 
(describing the Workplace Flexibility Act’s procedures as “restrictive, cumbersome and costly”); 
Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles Labor & Employment Alert: The New Millennium Means the Return of 
Daily Overtime, FINDLAW, 1999, available at http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jul/1/131002. 
html (predicting that “few employers will utilize the alternative workweek schedules” authorized by the 
Workplace Flexibility Act because they “provide very little scheduling flexibility, and impose 
significant procedural burdens on employers”); Legislation Loosens Up Alternative Work Week 
Schedule Rules, SMALL BUSINESS CAL., Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.smallbusinesscalifornia.org/ 
Alternative%20Work%20Week%20Schedule.htm (describing the election process as “convoluted”). 
214 See Employer, Employee Testimony Illustrates Need for Flexible Work Schedules, 
CALCHAMBER, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/04102008ts.aspx; see also 
CalChamber Urges Support, supra note 213. 
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describing the existing procedural requirements as too cumbersome to ever 
be widely used.  Although employers are required to report all election 
results to a designated state agency, the agency’s recordkeeping methods 
make it difficult to determine accurately how many California employers 
currently are operating under a certified compressed work schedule.  The 
California Division of Labor Statistics and Research maintains a 
searchable online database of all California employers that have filed 
alternative work week election results.215  This database includes an entry 
for every report that the agency has received since the Workplace 
Flexibility Act became effective on January 1, 2000—totaling over 18,500 
entries.216  For several reasons, that total likely exceeds the number of 
California employers that currently are operating under a certified 
compressed work plan.  First, the entries include reports of unsuccessful 
elections to adopt a compressed schedule, as well as reports of successful 
elections to repeal previously adopted plans.  Second, there are many 
instances of multiple entries for single employers, many of which file 
separate reports for multiple elections in different work units within their 
organization.  Finally, there is no way to easily determine whether the 
employers listed in the database are still using their certified alternative 
work schedules, whether the affected work units still exist, or whether the 
employers are even still in business.  Nevertheless, the over 18,500 entries 
at least provide an upper limit to the estimated number of employers that 
have used the election procedures to adopt an eligible compressed work 
plan.217 
While business interest groups might use this data to support their 
critique of California’s Workplace Flexibility Act as going too far, some 
work/family advocates may criticize the law from the opposite direction, 
by questioning whether the law’s procedural mechanisms do enough to 
enable the expression of a collective employee voice.  While the Act 
removes the initial burden that individual reflexive laws place on 
individual employees to initiate the process, it does so by giving 
employers—not groups of employees—the ability to control the 
                                                                                                                          
215 See Alternative Workweek Elections Database, http://www.dir.ca.gov/databases/dlsr/DLSR-
AWE.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010). 
216 See id. (click “dlsr-awe.zip”).  California Labor Code section 511(e) requires that employers 
report the results of all such elections to the Division of Labor Statistics and Research within thirty 
days after the results are final.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(e).  The IWC’s implementing wage orders 
require that the reports of election results be made public.  See, e.g., Industrial Welfare Commission 
Order 4-2001 Regulating Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions in the Professional, Technical, 
Clerical, Mechanical and Similar Occupations, ¶3(C)(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2001 as amended), available 
at http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle4.pdf. 
217 This observation is consistent with one published estimate on March 31, 2006, that “[a]bout 
11,000 of the state’s 800,000-plus employers” were then operating under a certified alternative work 
week plan.  See Posting of Cal Labor Law to California Labor & Employment Law Blog, 
http://www.callaborlaw.com/archives/new-laws-legislation-two-bills-introduced-to-increase-workweek 
-flexibility.html (Mar. 31, 2006). 
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parameters of the discussion.  The Act empowers employers to select the 
specific alternative work schedules to include in a proposal to an affected 
work unit, rather than vice versa.  While the Act grants employees 
collective control over the results of an employer’s proposal, employees’ 
collective voice in designing workplace schedules is largely constrained to 
merely affirming or rejecting what an employer puts on the table.  Such an 
approach certainly can help the parties identify some alternative work 
schedules that will be mutually beneficial, and it allows employers to 
obtain valuable aggregate data about employees’ desires and working time 
constraints.  Nevertheless, this particular collective reflexive approach falls 
short of envisioning and situating employees as creative collaborators in 
the process. 
B.  The Federal Alternative Work Schedules Act 
The Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules 
Act, which is also known as the Alternative Work Schedules Act 
(“AWSA”),218 provides the second example of a collective reflexive form 
of regulation in the context of the four-day work week.  Like California’s 
Workplace Flexibility Act, the AWSA’s existence is linked to the 
existence of daily overtime obligations.  As in California, most non-exempt 
federal employees are entitled to daily overtime premiums for all hours 
over eight in a single work day.219  When the federal government became 
interested in encouraging compressed work weeks as a traffic congestion 
measure and as a response to the oil crisis of the 1970s, legislators were 
able to use the carrot of reduced payroll expenses for daily overtime as an 
incentive to encourage federal agencies to experiment with a four-day 
work week.220 
Similar to California law, the AWSA establishes a procedure by which 
a federal agency may adopt a compressed work week that is exempt from 
most of the standard daily overtime requirements.221  In a non-organized 
work unit of a federal agency, this procedure requires an affirmative vote 
of a majority of the employees in an affected work unit.222  Unlike 
                                                                                                                          
218 Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120–6133 
(2006); see Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305 (noting the common name). 
219 5 U.S.C. § 5542(a)(1) (2006). 
220 See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307–10 (describing the history of the AWSA). 
221 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 6127–6128.  The AWSA regulates both the use of compressed work weeks 
and the use of flexible schedules that allow employees to vary their daily arrival and departure times 
within certain parameters.  See id. §§ 6122–6126.  This Article limits its focus to the rules governing 
compressed work weeks. 
222 See id. § 6127(b)(1).  A work unit is defined for purposes of the AWSA as “an entity located in 
one place with a specific mission, with homogeneous procedures or technology, and headed by a 
supervisor or manager authorized to approve time and attendance reports and approve leave.”  U.S. 
OFFICE PERS. MGMT., HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES § 2 (1996) [hereinafter 
HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES]. 
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California law, the AWSA and its supporting agency documents do not 
specify any details regarding the voting process, which gives agencies 
much greater flexibility in conducting elections.223  Similar to California 
law, the AWSA includes a secondary individual accommodation right 
when the compressed work schedule would “impose a personal hardship” 
on an employee due to caregiving responsibilities or for any other 
reason.224  Employers that adopt compressed work schedules under the 
AWSA are required to establish a procedure for employees to submit their 
personal hardship requests.225  As a public employer, a federal agency 
always retains the right to end a compressed work schedule if the agency 
finds an adverse impact on productivity, provision of services, or cost of 
operations, unlike under California law, which vests a repeal right in the 
hands of affected employees in private workplace settings.226  The AWSA 
does incorporate some of the provisions found in California law that 
address work/family balance issues, such as encouraging schedule 
predictability by retaining standard overtime premiums whenever an 
employee is required to work hours beyond those regularly scheduled 
under the compressed work plan.227 
The streamlined procedures for adopting a compressed work week 
under the AWSA may have contributed to their more widespread use 
within federal agencies than within the private sector that is governed by 
the more complicated procedures under California law.  Nevertheless, 
many federal agencies still may not have experimented with the full extent 
of flexible workplace options permitted and encouraged by the AWSA.228  
                                                                                                                          
223 See 5 U.S.C. § 6127(b)(1); see also HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES, supra 
note 222, § 7(b) (stating that “[i]n an unorganized unit, a majority of affected employees must vote to 
be included in a [compressed work schedule] program”); id. § 13(o)(1) (explaining that “a compressed 
work schedule may not be established in an unorganized unit unless a majority of employees in the 
organization who would be included vote to be included,” which requires that “the number of 
affirmative votes exceeds fifty percent of the number of employees and supervisors in the organization 
proposed for inclusion in a compressed work schedule”). 
224 See 5 U.S.C. § 6127(b)(2).  The employee is required to make a written request to the agency.  
Id.  If the agency determines that the employee’s participation in the compressed schedule would 
impose a personal hardship, the agency must either except the employee from the compressed schedule 
or reassign the employee to the first available position within the agency that is not part of the 
compressed work week plan and for which the employee is qualified.  Id.  See also HANDBOOK ON 
ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES, supra note 222, § 13(p)(2) (explaining how agencies should 
determine whether a personal hardship exists and identifying caregiving responsibilities for “disabled 
family members or dependent children” as potential grounds for a hardship finding). 
225 See HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES, supra note 222, § 13(p)(1). 
226 See 5 U.S.C. § 6131(a). 
227 See id. § 6128(b). 
228 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, 
ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES: MANY AGENCIES DO NOT ALLOW EMPLOYEES THE FULL 
FLEXIBILITY PERMITTED BY LAW 4, 14 (1994), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ 
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/13/4f/c7.pdf  (concluding from a review of fifty-nine 
federal agencies that although “large numbers of employees” are using either flexible or compressed 
schedules, “many employees are not allowed to use [alternative work schedules], and few organizations 
allow their employees to use the options offering the greatest flexibility”). 
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In 1994, the United States General Accounting Office surveyed fifty-nine 
federal agencies and found that fifty-seven of them offered some form of 
flexible work scheduling authorized by the AWSA for at least some of 
their employees.229  This survey, however, also found that many employees 
who desired greater scheduling flexibility were not permitted to use 
various options that are authorized by the AWSA and that few agencies 
used the permissible scheduling options that provided employees with the 
greatest control over their working hours.230  Despite finding that “large 
numbers of employees in many organizations” were using flexible options 
authorized by the AWSA, the report recommended moving beyond the 
Act’s existing reflexive approach that merely creates incentives for 
experimenting with workplace flexibility, by requesting a Presidential 
Executive Order requiring all federal agencies to adopt alternative work 
schedule programs.231 
While it would be helpful to obtain more recent data to fully assess the 
AWSA’s effects, this report’s conclusion highlights the obvious point that, 
like all work/family policy initiatives, the collective reflexive approaches 
in California’s Workplace Flexibility Act and the federal AWSA will never 
be the singular solution to work/family conflict.  Both of these examples 
themselves incorporate multiple regulatory approaches, as both supplement 
their primary grants of collective process rights with secondary opt-out 
entitlements in the form of individual accommodation rights.  In doing so, 
these laws not only illustrate one particular incarnation of a collective 
reflexive approach, but also illustrate how this under-developed approach 
might work as a component of broader work/family regulatory reforms.  
Collective reflexive approaches possess the same potential strengths of 
reflexive regulation more generally: they facilitate information exchange in 
a non-adversarial forum that encourages jointly-designed and tailored 
solutions to the structuring of working time within a particular workplace.  
At the same time, collective reflexive approaches attempt to address the 
risk of under-utilization in models that depend exclusively on the ability 
and willingness of individual employees to initiate and participate in a 
workplace procedure.  In addition, these collective reflexive approaches 
may facilitate a broader exchange of relevant information within a 
workplace, which could further advance the goal of achieving scheduling 
innovation that is beneficial to employers and employees alike. 
Of course, the existence of both the California Workplace Flexibility 
Act and the federal AWSA depended, somewhat paradoxically, upon the 
existence of a legal disincentive to workplace flexibility—i.e., upon the 
existence of daily overtime premium obligations.  While this fact may limit 
                                                                                                                          
229 Id. at 4. 
230 Id. at 14. 
231 Id. 
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the potential for experimenting with similar approaches elsewhere, it also 
highlights the importance of work/family proposals that focus on revising 
wage and hours laws as a necessary first step toward more fundamental 
working time innovation.232  In addition, both the California Workplace 
Flexibility Act and the federal AWSA assume, to a large degree, a pre-
existing norm of a forty-hour work week.  Thus, like all four-day work 
week initiatives, they share a limited ability to reach the often acute 
work/family conflicts experienced by the growing population of workers 
laboring at both ends of the time divide.  Nevertheless, they provide 
interesting models of an under-developed strand of reflexive regulation 
that is worth considering, not just in capitalizing on the unique opportunity 
to influence the current four-day work week debate, but also when 
considering future regulation of workplace flexibility more generally. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
According to the headline of a Time article in September 2009, “The 
Four-Day Workweek Is Winning Fans.”233  On the heels of Utah’s 
adoption of a four-day work week for approximately 17,000 of its public 
employees, such headlines have become commonplace, as both the 
economic crisis and environmental concerns have converged to bring 
compressed work weeks to center stage.234  Although work/family 
concerns have not played a driving role in this recent intense interest in the 
four-day work week, advocates increasingly have begun to invoke 
work/family benefits as a way to win additional fans.  Utah’s experience is 
illustrative.  While former Utah Governor Jon Huntsman made it clear that 
reducing energy expenses was the motivation for his Executive Order 
moving most of his state’s employees to a four-day work week,235 Utah’s 
Executive Director for Human Resources, Jeff Herring, was quick to 
                                                                                                                          
232 See, e.g., JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 183–87 (proposing to eliminate the white-collar 
exemptions from the FLSA to bring a larger proportion of the workforce within the law’s overtime 
premium rules, and to move the standard work week from forty to thirty-five hours per week); Schultz 
& Hoffman, supra note 66, at 140–41 (same). 
233 Bryan Walsh, The Four-Day Workweek Is Winning Fans, TIME, Sept. 7, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1919162,00.html. 
234 See, e.g., Brock Vergakis, 4-Day Week Seems To Work Well for Utah, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 
2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/03/01/4_day_week_seems_to_work_well_for_ 
utah/; Utah Is Going to a 4-Day Workweek: In an Effort To Save Energy, State Employees Will Get 
Friday Off, MSNBC, July 3, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25518225/; Utah’s 4-Day Workweek 
Brings Some Dividends, CONNECT2UTAH, Oct. 22, 2009, http://connect2utah.com/content/news/story/? 
cid=58071. 
235 See Utah Exec. Order No. 2008/0006 (July 31, 2008), reprinted in 16 Utah Bull. 1 (Aug. 15, 
2008), available at http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/bull_pdf/2008/b20080815.pdf; see also 
Vergakis, supra note 234 (noting that Utah switched most of its state employees to a four-day work 
week “primarily to save money on electricity, gasoline, and other energy expenses”); Utah Is Going to 
a 4-Day Workweek, supra note 234 (describing the estimated energy savings that a four-day work week 
would produce); Utah’s 4-Day Workweek Brings Some Dividends, supra note 234 (noting “Former 
Gov. Jon Huntsman made the switch for Utah in August 2008, largely to cut energy costs”). 
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promote the plan to the media as a way to “‘really make a difference for 
work-life balance.’”236  The federal AWSA similarly began as a traffic 
control and energy conservation measure, but decades later gave President 
Clinton something to point to when addressing the growing concerns of 
employees who are balancing work and family demands.237 
The recent spotlight on the four-day work week provides work/family 
advocates with a unique opportunity to enter the public debate and raise 
awareness about the real potential—and real limitations—of this particular 
form of working time innovation.  This includes the opportunity to educate 
policy makers, the public, and the press about the heterogeneous sources of 
work/family conflict and the very different needs of workers who are 
laboring at different occupational statuses, different income levels, and 
different points along the time divide.  While the empirical research indeed 
supports the claim that a compressed work schedule can enhance 
work/family balance for some workers, the four-day work week is unlikely 
to become available for many workers whose often acute work/family 
conflicts result from very long-hour positions, or from very unpredictable 
and insecure short-hour jobs.  While the four-day work week may provide 
real benefits to some groups of workers, including those working asocial 
and often variable shift-work, work/family advocates need to challenge 
undifferentiated assertions of work/family benefits from a compressed 
work week design. 
While these observations might lead work/family advocates to shift 
their priorities elsewhere, the current attention being paid to the four-day 
work week offers the further opportunity to consider how legal regulation 
might be used most effectively to advance workplace flexibility for a 
broader group of workers.  To that end, the unique regulations in 
California’s Workplace Flexibility Act and the federal AWSA illustrate an 
under-developed “collective reflexive” approach that may add a new 
dimension to future workplace flexibility reform efforts.  To the extent that 
the four-day work week helps facilitate these types of continued legal and 
policy discussions about how to restructure the workplace around the norm 
of a worker with caregiving responsibilities, I have become a fan as well. 
                                                                                                                          
236 See Walsh, supra note 233. 
237 See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307–14 (chronicling the legislative history of the 
AWSA). 
